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ANTITRUST ERROR
ALAN DEVLIN* & MICHAEL JACOBS**
ABSTRACT
Fueled by economics, antitrust has evolved into a highly sophis-
ticated body of law. Its malleable doctrine enables courts to tailor
optimal standards to a wide variety of economic phenomena. Indeed,
economic theory has been so revolutionary that modern U.S. compe-
tition law bears little resemblance to that which prevailed fifty years
ago. Yet, for all the contributions of economics, its explanatory
powers are subject to important limitations. Profound questions
remain at the borders of contemporary antitrust enforcement, but
answers remain elusive. It is because of the epistemological limita-
tions of economic analysis that antitrust remains unusually vulnera-
ble to error.
The fear of mistakenly ascribing anticompetitive labels to innocu-
ous conduct is now pervasive. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
framed its rulings in a manner that shows sensitivity to the unavoid-
ability of error. In doing so, it has adopted the principle of decision
theory that Type I errors are generally to be preferred over Type II. It
has crafted a pro-defendant body of jurisprudence accordingly. In
2008, the Justice Department picked up the gauntlet and published
the first definitive attempt at extrapolating optimal error rules. Yet,
in 2009, the new administration promptly withdrew the report,
opining that it could “separate the wheat from the chaff” and thus
marginalizing the issue of error. Notwithstanding this confident
proclamation, error remains as visible as ever. Intel’s behavior in
offering rebates has been subject to wildly fluctuating analysis by the
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U.S. and E.U. enforcement agencies. In a marked departure from
precedent, the DOJ is again viewing vertical mergers with concern.
And the agency has reversed course on the legality of exclusionary
payments in the pharmaceutical industry. Antitrust divergence, both
within and outside the United States, remains painfully apparent,
demonstrable proof that vulnerability to error remains systemic. For
this reason, error analysis may be the single most important
unresolved issue facing modern competition policy.
This Article seeks to challenge the contemporary mode of error
analysis in antitrust law. We explain the causes and consequences of
antitrust error and articulate a variety of suggested cures. In doing
so, we debunk the current presumption that false positives are
necessarily to be preferred over false negatives. We highlight a variety
of cases in which the contemporary bias in favor of underenforcement
should be revisited.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ or Justice Department) agreed to
undertake a review of antitrust enforcement against monopolistic
conduct.1 This review was to culminate in a joint report setting forth
their views and proposing, among other things, a general test for
assessing arguably anticompetitive, unilateral conduct.2 The review
was undertaken, but the 2008 report that followed was approved by
the Justice Department alone.3 The general test that it proposed
—no enforcement unless evidence demonstrated “substantial
disproportion[ality]” between the anticompetitive harm and the
procompetitive benefit caused by the conduct in question4—adopted
the view that antitrust enforcement was so prone to administrative
and judicial error that a wide margin of safety was necessary to
prevent errors that would punish or discourage vigorously competi-
tive conduct. The FTC strenuously disagreed with that proposal,
believing that it unfairly biased antitrust inquiry in favor of
dominant firms.5 In 2009, after the change in administration, the
newly appointed head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ withdrew
the report, in disagreement with its view of administrative error,
piously announcing that there would be no errors on her watch.6
These dramatic events underscore the central role of error in
antitrust enforcement and adjudication. They also illustrate the
crucial importance of identifying optimal modes of error analysis.
This Article seeks to engage contemporary error rules in antitrust
and in doing so, explain the source of indeterminacy in this area of
1. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT vii (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/reports/236681.pdf.
2. See id.
3. See Dawn Goulet, Consumer News, Justice Department’s Section 2 Report Sparks a
Heated Debate in the Antitrust Community, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 268, 269 (2008).
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, passim.
5. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice Report
(Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm.
6. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on
Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/
09-at-459.html.
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the law, reveal why the current mode of error treatment is unsatis-
factory, and discern the optimal method of approaching rulemaking
in the uncertain world of antitrust adjudication.
Error is uniquely prevalent in this field because antitrust is
routinely called upon to deliver answers to unsolvable problems.7
The intertemporal impact of commercial conduct denies policy-
makers crucial information about future effects, which, combined
with the epistemological limitations of contemporary economic
theory, necessitates decision making under uncertainty. The chronic
degree of indeterminism that pervades this area of law makes
mistaken conclusions understandable—even inevitable—but it does
not render them any less costly. For these reasons, it is hardly
surprising that competition law displays a unique fixation with
error.8
Courts, agencies, and academics have reacted to antitrust’s
unusual vulnerability to error by adopting a bias in favor of false
negatives (Type II errors).9 Believing that procompetitive behavior
erroneously condemned will result in a permanent loss of the
behavior’s benefit, and reasoning that anticompetitive conduct
wrongly permitted will be ephemeral due to the market’s self-
correcting nature, the law seeks to err on the side of underenforce-
ment.10 This principle has proven to be remarkably influential with
respect to antitrust scrutiny of dominant-firm behavior, in particu-
lar. Meanwhile, the various premises upon which the modern U.S.
error rule has been built have remained unquestioned. 
Unfortunately, the role of error analysis in U.S. antitrust law is
imperfect. First, the current approach assumes that the risk of
mistake is uniform. The law thus posits that all Type I errors are
equal in magnitude and probability. Similarly, Type II errors are
assumed to be constant. Second, the law acts as if error is apt to
7. For the authors’ prior discussion on this subject, see Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs,
Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1429541.
8. See Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical
Context, 22 ANTITRUST 21, 21 (2007); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust:
Using New Data and Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 669
(2009).
9. See Fred S. McChesney, Talking ’Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and
in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1413 (2003).
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 passim (1984).
80 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:075
arise to the same extent for all offenses, other than for those
condemned as per se illegal. This is particularly true of violations
allegedly committed by a monopolist or within a vertical market
structure. Yet, there is limited theoretical or empirical basis for
such an assumption. Third, the law assumes that the same error
rule—Type II mistakes are to be preferred over Type I—should
apply to all instances in which the risk of error is present. This
uncritical conclusion results in an overbroad heuristic that departs
from the optimal rule with unacceptable regularity.
The prevailing response to the systemic problem of indeter-
minism is therefore unsatisfactory. We suggest in particular that
antitrust law’s unwavering promotion of false negatives over false
positives is nonoptimal, and reflects inadequate engagement with
the substantive problem. To construct an optimal heuristic, one
must first determine the frequency with which the two forms of
error actually occur in administration and litigation. Next, one must
determine the severity of the errors in each category and the likely
temporal range of this severity. In particular, one must determine
the length of time necessary for Type II errors to be washed from
the system—that is, for the market to return to its predistortion
competitive state. 
The law assumes that Type I errors result in the perpetual loss
of efficiencies, but what about the second-best solutions that
markets will devise in response to Type I errors? Surely some of
these will be almost as desirable as the impugned behavior. If so,
this suggests that the true cost of Type I errors might be lower than
claimed. Moreover, although currently assumed, it is not the case
that erroneous rules are perpetual. Nor can the market always be
trusted to correct anticompetitive conditions mistakenly condoned.
Antitrust history is replete with examples of improper rules quick-
ly being circumvented long before they are formally overruled.
Furthermore, recent experience suggests that monopolistic behavior
may not always be eliminated by the market in a timely fashion,
especially where powerful network effects are present.
These nuanced points have largely escaped the attention of
enforcement agencies, courts, practitioners, and academics. The
current default rule in favor of underenforcement thus lacks a solid
intellectual foundation and needs revision. We find that one-size-
fits-all error rules are unlikely to yield optimal enforcement and
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liability determinations. Instead, behavior-specific heuristics that
depart from a dogmatic aversion to Type I errors in appropriate
circumstances can and should be developed. This Article explores a
range of commercial conduct and suggests that scenarios exist in
which an unqualified predilection in favor of false negatives is
unsuitable.
Although we conclude that antitrust should depart from its
predisposition to avoiding Type I errors in certain settings, even
then it should approach lawsuits initiated by private parties with a
high degree of suspicion.11 Private plaintiffs’ assertions of anticom-
petitive conduct are paradigmatically noncredible, which ought to
color courts’ reception of those claims. We believe that private
claims of monopolization should be met with particular skepticism.
Yet it is not clear that actions initiated by the enforcement
agencies should encounter similar hostility. Although these bodies
may be inclined for political reasons to adopt an excessively or in-
adequately aggressive posture, legitimate disagreement over the
proper rate of intervention in the economy exists. Given the
agencies’ expertise, the judiciary should be willing to consider novel
theories of anticompetitive effect that they might advance. Of
course, the judiciary must hold the enforcement agencies to the law,
but the dialectic approach to competition policy promises to yield a
richer body of jurisprudence. One need only survey the evolution of
merger doctrine to see how the agencies can transform substantive
law into far more nuanced and economically sophisticated form. In
sum, the enforcement agencies are less prone to bringing erroneous
enforcement actions. Traditional error analysis should therefore be
relaxed in cases initiated by the FTC and DOJ.
Part II frames the issue of antitrust error in its proper context,
describes the epistemological dilemma that characterizes antitrust
jurisprudence, explores how U.S. law has sought to accommodate
indeterminism in its substantive doctrine and enforcement philoso-
phy, and explains the shortfalls of contemporary modes of error
analysis. We then discuss conduct-specific error rules, showing in
the process how the prevailing bias in favor of false negatives is, at
times, nonoptimal. More nuanced analysis reveals that the probabil-
ity and magnitude of various outcomes can be considereda reality
11. See Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 367, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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that requires the law to be open to preferring false positives in some
cases. We also explain why courts’ aversion to Type I errors should
be relaxed in the presence of lawsuits initiated by the FTC or DOJ.
We conclude that significant revisions are needed in the application
of error rules to antitrust cases.
I. THE ROLE OF ERROR IN COMPETITION LAW
A. The Contemporary Role of Error Analysis 
In 2009, the new head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust
Division confidently proclaimed that her administration could solve
the definitive problem that has long plagued antitrust enforcement
—the ever-present risk of erroneous condemnation.12 With her bold
assertion that the DOJ can “separate the wheat from the chaff,” and
avoid error entirely, Christine Varney effectively dismissed two
decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence focused on developing rules
to minimize the frequency and impact of erroneous decisions.13 Her
view lacks a foundation, however, in history, logic, or economics.
Antitrust enforcement is inevitably hindered by a fundamental
dilemma: for a variety of reasons, the economic impact of many
contestable business behaviors is uncertain and therefore very
difficult to assess correctly ex ante. 
For the past thirty years, the antitrust community has operated
on the basis of a simple consensus regarding a few general princi-
ples. Commentators generally agree that preserving and promoting
“consumer welfare” should be the main objective of antitrust en-
forcement, and that an unhindered competitive process is desirable
because it promises to serve those interests better than any avail-
able alternative.14 Much of the time, however, it is unclear whether
particular business conduct will promote consumer welfare, harm
it, or leave it undisturbed. For example, conduct that causes harm
in the present may bestow greater benefit in the uncertain future.
12. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6.
13. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement
in this Challenging Era 6 (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/245777.pdf.
14. See McChesney, supra note 9, at 1407 n.29.
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Given the inability of economic theory to quantify or even to esti-
mate the repercussions of much challenged conduct, the danger of
erroneous decision making is systemic.
The epistemological limitations of economic theory are crucially
important. Much of the business conduct that attracts regulatory
attention is characterized by asymmetric intertemporal effects,
which can be neither measured empirically nor satisfactorily
approximated by theory. The relationship between innovation and
monopoly is not yet fully understood,15 but it would seem that the
two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.16 Economics is incap-
able of providing enforcers many of the definitive answers they
seek. Lacking sufficient information, courts and agencies are
forced to formulate doctrine in the dark. How can they construct
rules responsibly when handicapped by such a knowledge deficit?
They have done so by employing decision theory, the branch of
microeconomics concerned with optimal choice in the presence of
uncertainty. This theory often suggests a preference for Type II
errors, or false negatives.17 In the familiar setting of criminal law,
where error is also a chief concern of both substantive doctrine and
enforcement policy, most people consider it worse to convict an
innocent person than to free a guilty one.18 As a result, the standard
of proof in criminal law is more demanding than in other settings,
and more guilty people walk free than would otherwise be the case.
This result is generally accepted as the necessary cost of minimizing
miscarriages of justice.19
Antitrust law has adopted this standard in an analogous, but
simplistic, manner. It has embraced the principle championed by
Chief Judge Easterbrook that competition policy should err on the
15. See Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 509-10 (1999); David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty,
and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 732-33 (2001); F.M. Scherer,
Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1010-12 (1987).
16. To complicate matters further, distortions that arise in one market often permeate
through to seemingly unrelated segments of the economy. Yet, these inefficiencies are difficult
to track and, for that reason, are sometimes omitted from consideration entirely.
17. See Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Bad Arguments in Corporate Law, 78 GEO. L.J. 1551,
1553 (1990).
18. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right To Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
19. See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 460 (1989).
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side of underenforcement, since anticompetitive effects that escape
condemnation will usually be eroded by the market, while the
procompetitive benefits of an incorrectly outlawed action will be lost
forever.20 Though not applied as an explicit rule, this principle has
significantly influenced the substantive and procedural barriers
to recovery created by the courts. The judiciary and enforcement
agencies have crafted a body of law that reacts skeptically to the
complaints of an antitrust defendant’s injured rivals.21 An antitrust
plaintiff faces an uphill battle in pleading and proving the constitu-
ent elements of the relevant cause of action.22 Doctrine has been
deliberately crafted to siphon off complaints that bear an unaccept-
able propensity for false positives. The result is akin to the criminal
setting: many consumer-injuring acts go unpunished, a consequence
perceived as the necessary cost of ensuring that the law does not
mistakenly stifle incentives to compete.
The inclination to err on the side of Type II errors has aligned
the U.S. judiciary in large degree with the conservative teachings
of the Chicago School.23 From the late 1970s, the courts have sys-
tematically revisited prior doctrine that facilitated recovery in cases
of competitor complaint.24 Per se rules against vertical price- and
market-sharing agreements have been abandoned.25 A plaintiff
alleging attempted monopolization must now prove that the ag-
gressor had a dangerous probability of success.26 Product tying is no
20. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 2-3.
21. See William J. Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Continuing the Transatlantic Dialogue, 23 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513, 534 (2002); Charles F. Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive
Marketplace: When Is an Antitrust Response Appropriate?, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 421, 431 (1988);
Diane P. Wood, The U.S. Antitrust Laws in a Global Context, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 265,
270.
22. See Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky,
54 WAYNE L. REV. 983, 1004 (2008).
23. Id.
24. See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1,
34-35.
25. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007)
(overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)); State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)); Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1977)).
26. See James F. Ponsoldt, Clarifying the Attempt To Monopolize Offense as an Alternative
to Protectionist Legislation: The Conditional Relevance of “Dangerous Probability of Success,”
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longer per se illegal, but requires proof of several additional factors,
including evidence that the tie will lead to market power in the tied
market.27 Price- and market-sharing agreements are no longer
necessarily illegal when they are ancillary restraints that promote
a larger good.28 Price squeezes by dominant, vertically integrated
firms have been declared legal.29 Horizontal mergers that increase
market concentration are no longer automatically unlawful.30 The
duty of a monopolist to share its intellectual or tangible resources
with a rival has been narrowed to the point of being virtually
nonexistent.31
These developments significantly impede plaintiffs’ ability to
recover for losses caused by allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
There are doubtless many cases in which an aggrieved party has
suffered injury that flows from a wrongful act. But contemporary
rules deny recovery in at least some of these instances. According to
the modern U.S. view, such inequities are justified because they are
not as bad as erroneous outcomes in the opposite direction. An
overly intrusive standard might create a constrictive business
environment that would hamper the ability of innovative firms to
compete, to succeed, and to enjoy their pecuniary rewards free from
liability. Were the law to err in this direction, proscribing conduct
that nudged the imprecise border between “vigorously competitive”
and “anticompetitive,” the dynamic nature of the U.S. economy
would be weakened, and consumers made to pay a very large price,
in the form of diminished competition.32
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1986).
27. See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210
(7th Cir. 1985).
28. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 132-33 (1984); Thomas
A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1794-97 (1994).
29. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Comm., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1114-15, 1122 (2009).
30. Compare United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966), United States
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1963), and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 346 (1962), with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(1992) (rev. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
31. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408-09
(2004).
32. See Thomas O. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 859, 859-61, 866-67 (2007).
86 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:075
These concerns provide the source of the modern U.S. antitrust-
error rule, and explain its preference for false negatives. But why is
an error rule necessary at all? What accounts for antitrust’s unique
admission, within civil law, of vulnerability to mistaken ascriptions
of guilt or innocence? Part I.B answers these questions, explaining
why antitrust determinations are unusually susceptible to error.
This Article then explores, in some detail, the shortcomings of
contemporary error analysis and places those failings in the larger
context of interagency disputes concerning the appropriate analysis
of business conduct whose long-run competitive effects are uncer-
tain.
B. Antitrust’s Unique Vulnerability to Error
More than any other area of civil law, antitrust is error-prone. Its
primary statutes are confoundingly ambiguous.33 Its basic analytical
methodology is hopelessly imprecise. The economic terms at the
heart of many of its important doctrinal questions—terms such as
“cost,” “market,” “monopoly power,” and “entry barrier”—are either
vague, contestable, or both. In many cases, the answer to the
question of interest—whether certain conduct is harmful to con-
sumers—can depend upon first identifying and then comparing
current or past harms and benefits with those likely, but not
certain, to arise in the future. This comparison involves measuring
the relative size of a known set of facts, on the one hand, and an
uncertain but theoretically predictable future outcome, on the
other. And finally, antitrust trials—famous, or notorious, for their
complexity34—are often heard by lay juries unfamiliar with the
relevant economics, save through conflicting and often equally
33. See Michael Komenda, Recent Development, The Course Correction a Century in the
Making: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 867-68 (2008); Carl N. Pickerill, Note, Specialized Adjudication
in an Administrative Forum: Bridging the Gap Between Public and Private Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1605, 1620 n.82 (2007).
34. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1186 n.122
(2008). But see Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex
Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. LITIG. 47, 74-78 (1980).
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persuasive experts;35 and those juries are empowered to award large
judgments, which are then automatically trebled.36
The text of Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws all “contracts ...
in restraint of trade.”37 So utterly impracticable is a literal interpre-
tation of those words—it is the nature of every contract to restrain
trade—that for nearly one hundred years, the Supreme Court has
read the law to proscribe only those restraints that are “unreason-
able,”38 a reading that has created the analytical methodology called
“the rule of reason.”39 As one might expect, the notion of commer-
cially “unreasonable” behavior is neither clear nor fixed. Except for
those few kinds of conduct—horizontal price-fixing and market
division—judged to be “per se” unlawful,40 the courts subject all
other allegedly “unreasonable” conduct to full-blown rule-of-reason
analysis, the object of which is to determine whether, on balance,
the impugned conduct impedes or advances “consumer welfare.”41
This term is used to describe a state of economic affairs in which
quality-adjusted output is expanding, or at least not contracting.42
We will return shortly to this method of analysis and its acute
proclivity for error. But suffice it to say here that the term “unrea-
sonable,” on which the interpreted text hinges, is vague enough to
create concerns about erroneous judgments.43
The text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is even more famously
opaque.44 The core of that section proscribes “monopolization,” a
term that is not defined in the statute, and one whose general
meaning has—though not for lack of trying—escaped coherent
35. See Yane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 593, 612 (2007).
36. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
37. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
38. See William Letwin, The First Decade of the Sherman Act: Judicial Interpretation, 68
YALE L.J. 900, 918-22 (1959).
39. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
40. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 347-48 (1982); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 218, 223 (1940).
41. See Piraino, supra note 28, at 1757-60, 1767.
42. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th
Cir. 1992); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986).
43. See Nolan Ezra Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization
Standard, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1985).
44. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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definition.45 There is, to be sure, a broad judicial consensus that
the offense of “monopolization” consists of two parts: (a) monopoly
status, or other direct proof of monopoly power, and (b) “unlawful
and exclusionary practices,” or conduct that is “unfair” or “preda-
tory.”46 But that is as far as the consensus goes, and for good reason.
Setting aside the significant difficulties of market definition that
regularly afflict the analysis of the first part of the offense,47 it is
sadly self-evident that the term “unlawfully exclusionary” is cir-
cular, and that its counterparts, “unfair” and “predatory,” have no
determinate meaning.48 Finally, the recent history of antitrust
litigation has demonstrated beyond dispute that novel practices
undertaken by dominant firms can disrupt market stability and
harm smaller rivals. In the process, they may sometimes generate
enormous benefits for consumers, but on other occasions they may
prove harmful to consumer interests. Critically, the line between
novel conduct that is beneficial, on the one hand, and its harmful
counterpart, on the other, is often so thin as to be invisible.49
Consequently, error casts a long shadow over Section 2 litigation, in
which, by many accounts, juries have recently made enormous and
costly mistakes.50 
Finally, Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns those mergers
that “may [tend] substantially to lessen competition,” another form
of words that can hardly be described as self-explanatory.51 Even if
it were clear what it might mean to “lessen competition” in the
abstract, the adverb “substantially” would inevitably cause con-
45. See id.; Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253, 255 (2003).
46. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Elhauge, supra note
45, at 257, 265 n.38.
47. See MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 210 (4th ed.
1997); Gregory J. Warden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department’s Merger
Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 530-31.
48. See Elhauge, supra note 45, at 265-70.
49. The Supreme Court has displayed sensitivity to this fact. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993).
50. See LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding over a sharp
dissent a $68 million jury verdict that 3M violated the antitrust laws by employing volume-
based bundled rebates); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 781-82 (6th Cir.
2002); see also Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 YALE
J. ON REG. 169, 205-06 (2006).
51. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
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fusion. Admittedly, and to their credit, DOJ and the FTC have for
the past twenty-five years published, revised, and frequently
explained their Merger Guidelines, which were drafted in part to
provide the business community with a modicum of clarity about
what to expect from agency merger analysis.52 But the point here is
that the guidelines were—and remain—necessary because in large
measure the statutory language governing mergers is so vague as
to be inadequate, and thus it creates yet another potential source of
error.
The vagueness of the antitrust statutes might not matter so much
if courts and agencies could call upon an analytical methodology
that would eliminate or significantly reduce the possibility of error
inherent in the statutory text. But no such methodology exists.
Indeed, in many ways the “rule of reason,” briefly described above,
compounds the problem of error. The Supreme Court requires a
court that engages in complete rule-of-reason analysis to inquire
into the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts.53
Notably, rule-of-reason analysis provides the dominant mode for
assessing claims under all three of the statutes discussed above.
Most Section 1 cases receive full rule-of-reason treatment.54 Many
Section 2 cases—those involving behavior not covered by a conduct-
specific test—are also analyzed by the full-blown rule of reason.55
And all contested mergers are subject to a version of it as well.56
52. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in
Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 775-77 (2006) (exploring the evolution of the
Merger Guidelines).
53. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
54. Piraino, supra note 28, at 1760.
55. See Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2008).
56. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 30, at 3.
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To see the difficulties inherent in the model, and why they
provoke concerns about error, imagine a relatively simple Section 2
private claim that survives a motion to dismiss, withstands a
motion for summary judgment, and goes through trial. And envision
as well that the claim charges a presumed monopolist57 with having
entered into a five-year exclusive dealing arrangement with a
particularly efficient distributor—Walmart, let’s say—which ac-
counts for 30 percent of all sales in the relevant market. The
plaintiff offers evidence that the exclusive contract has foreclosed its
access to Walmart’s shelves, which it claims will hurt not just the
plaintiff but consumers as well. 
This claim poses several difficulties for the trier of fact. In the
first place, the nature of the proof is likely to be that, even if the
monopolist has realized cost savings or other quantifiable benefits
from its contract with Walmart in the short term and passed them
on to consumers, in the long run its strategy will erode its rival’s
scale economies, or prevent them from materializing. In that
fashion, the plaintiff would argue, the monopolist will force the rival
to exit the market. Then, the monopolist will reduce output and
raise prices to consumers in the unspecified future—some time after
the exit occurs, assuming that entry barriers effectively deter new
rivals from competing with the dominant firm, and that nothing else
material has happened to change the product mix or consumer
tastes. Short-term consumer benefit—definite and measurable—
must be weighed against a complex scenario that might, but might
not, produce harm of some undetermined amount at some unknow-
able time in the future. Because of the intertemporal nature of the
claim—benefits now, perhaps bigger harms later—this “calculation”
can be no more than a guess, and guesses are often erroneous. 
Intertemporal effects arise in a whole host of antitrust scenarios.
All vertical restraints, including tying arrangements and bundled
discounts, produce consumer benefits now, and the potential for
consumer harm later. Predatory pricing produces consumer bene-
fits in the first phase but potential harm in the last phase. Every
refusal by a dominant firm to license its valuable intellectual
property (IP) to smaller rivals, to share with them a supposedly
“essential” facility, or to cooperate with them so as to enable them
57. We will extend the simplicity to avoid a dispute about the status component of the
offense.
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to become or remain competitively “viable,” will inevitably produce
harm in the first phase but is also likely to generate benefits—in the
form of safeguarded incentives to invent and invest in the fu-
ture—in later ones. So, too, with mergers: increased concentration
now might threaten higher prices in the short run, but might
generate enough synergies or efficiencies to drive prices down or
improve quality over time. 
But intertemporal effects resist measurement. When those effects
arise in an antitrust dispute, the trier of fact may well be able to
assess the effects that have already occurred, but it can do no more
than speculate about the relevant future consequences. The
information gap is unbridgeable. In every case requiring an inter-
temporal comparison, and there are many such cases, one of the
points of comparison will be both unknown and unknowable. Each
one of these cases, therefore, is fertile ground for error.
Of course, if antitrust analysis could somehow structure itself so
as to avoid “measuring” the future, the likelihood of judicial or
regulatory error would be greatly reduced. Indeed, if it could stick
to assessing the measurable past, that analysis would be a much
simpler exercise. Simpler, but hopelessly incomplete.58 In antitrust
thinking, static, backward-looking analysis is disfavored, and for
good reason. It has been supplanted by a dynamic approach that
looks to the future effects of current behaviors and tries to imagine
the full range of market responses to the business conduct at
issue—not simply those of consumers but also those of rivals, fringe
firms, new entrants, and investors.59 This dynamic approach is so
widely accepted and performed that one cannot realistically
contemplate an antitrust methodology divorced from concerns about
future competitive effects.60 But dynamic analysis and error inev-
itably go hand in hand. 
While errors caused by the problems of intertemporal measure-
ment are the most intractable, they are hardly the only kind of error
to arise regularly under rule-of-reason analysis. Imagine the earlier
exclusive-dealing example but remove the intertemporal quality of
58. See, e.g., Thomas O. Barnett, Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1199 (2008).
59. See Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 569-70
(1995).
60. See Scherer, supra note 15, at 998, 1001-02.
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the supposed consequences. Picture instead that once again the
conduct in question produced both harms and benefits—harms to
consumers in product market A but benefits to consumers in
product market B. And imagine as well that all of the harms and
benefits have already and fully occurred, and that each side
provides an expert economist to testify as to their magnitude. The
decision for the trier of fact thus involves “simply” an intermarket
comparison of harms and benefits. Suppose now that the plaintiff’s
economist testifies that the harms in market A over the relevant
five-year time period amounted to $12,000,000.00, while the
defendant’s economist testifies that the benefits in market B came
to $12,000,000.50. On this calculus, which represents the rule of
reason fully deployed, the jury would have to find for the defendant.
But who could feel confident that such a finding might not be
erroneous?
We have assumed thus far that the triers of fact—the district
court judges and juries—are not themselves a source of error,
though they face daunting and irresolvable measurement problems
that would baffle the brightest among us. But if the brightest of us
can only guess about the competitive effects of conduct with inter-
temporal consequences or multimarket repercussions, the average
person in the jury box and the average federal trial judge can do no
better—and might occasionally do worse.61 And who would fault
them for doing so? Antitrust trials are lengthy, complicated affairs
with massive amounts of evidence, which require jurors to make
sense of novel business behavior and its implications for consumers,
and in the process, sort out the conflicting testimony of well-
credentialed economic experts.62
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court seems implic-
itly, and sometimes expressly, to have recognized the enormous
61. See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist
Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals 1-2 (Jan. 27,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319888).
62. See Robert W. Meserve, Jury Instructions in Criminal Antitrust Cases: A Compilation
of Instructions Given by United States District Courts, 1923-1964, 79 HARV. L. REV. 870, 872
(1966) (book review); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
917 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s invitation to consider the existence of ‘market
power,’ for example, invites lengthy time-consuming argument among competing experts, as
they seek to apply abstract, highly technical, criteria to often ill-defined markets.” (citation
omitted)); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1421 (1998).
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difficulties and risks of entrusting complicated antitrust claims to
lay juries. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
made it more difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to survive a motion for
summary judgment, reversing the judicial bias against such motions
created in Poller v. CBS,63 and required plaintiffs to show that their
claim makes “economic sense.”64 Higher barriers for plaintiffs facing
summary judgment motions are very likely to reduce the number of
cases that reach trial, and thus likely to reduce the possibility of
trial error.65 More recently, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly an-
nounced new and more rigorous pleading requirements for antitrust
plaintiffs—requirements deemed necessary to protect defendants
and courts from the significant costs of discovery—in cases in which
the complaint fails to allege facts that plausibly suggest an antitrust
violation.66 It too can be seen in part as a response to (1) the
uncertainty attendant upon trial outcomes in antitrust cases, and
(2) the concerns that the high costs of discovery and fears of large
and erroneous jury verdicts can induce defendants to pay relatively
large amounts to settle nonmeritorious suits.
Finally, this discussion has thus far assumed that the language
of economics and its use in court make no independent contribution
to antitrust error. But that assumption is heroic. Most antitrust
cases hinge on market “definition,” a term that is at once fundamen-
tal to antitrust analysis and terribly imprecise.67 If the “market” is
improperly defined in an antitrust case—and market definition is
hotly contested in most cases of consequence68—then the outcome of
that case will almost certainly be incorrect. Many cases arising
under Section 2—all those dealing with price-to-cost ratios—focus
on the defendant’s “costs,” another term that is simultaneously
fundamental and imprecise. As many have noted, “cost” is an ac-
counting term, not necessarily an economics one.69 It is a moving
63. 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (holding that summary judgment should be used sparingly
in antitrust cases).
64. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
65. Though, of course, Matsushita opens the door to greater incidences of error at the
summary judgment stage.
66. 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007).
67. See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817, 825 (1987).
68. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1036-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 51-56, 80-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Oracle
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107-09 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
69. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making:
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target, flexible and manipulable. And, as is widely known, in the
case of multiproduct firms, allocating common costs among different
products is more a matter of art than of science.70 None of this is to
suggest that antitrust analysis should abandon its focus on markets,
or ignore testimony about costs. But it is to say that the fluidity and
imprecision of these basic terms create additional possibilities for
erroneous judgments.
For these reasons, antitrust law is uniquely vulnerable to error.
It ignores this vulnerability at its peril. The inability to reach
determinate and objectively verifiable conclusions does not relieve
the law or its enforcers from the responsibility for articulating the
best answers possible. Part I.C explores how judges, regulators,
practitioners, and academics have approached the systemic prob-
lems of error and indeterminism in antitrust cases. Part II then
seeks to make an informed contribution to the role of error analysis
in competition law.
C. Questioning Contemporary Error Analysis
1. Basic Error Analysis
Antitrust’s particular vulnerability to mistaken ascriptions of
harm compels responsible enforcers to proceed with caution. Aside
from this broad mandate though, what specific tenets of theory can
guide policymakers? The answer lies partly in the branch of
microeconomics concerned with optimal choice in the presence of
uncertainty.71 But how should this methodology, known as decision
theory, be employed?72
Professor Hylton provides a simple example of how decision
theory can inform error analysis in competition law.73 He posits a
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 584 (1986).
70. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:
Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 21 n.42 (1981).
71. See generally C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and
Antitrust, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41-43 (1999) (application of decision-making process in
antitrust cases).
72. For a general discussion on the role of decision theory in law, see ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 171-72
(2006).
73. See Keith N. Hylton, The Error Cost Approach to Section 2 Legal Standards, GLOBAL
COMPETITION POL’Y (2009). However, as we explain below, Professor Hylton misstates the
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scenario in which lawmakers must choose one of two antitrust
standards. The first carries a 25 percent likelihood of a false
acquittal and a 20 percent probability of a false conviction; the
second has a 20 percent chance of a false acquittal and a 25 percent
likelihood of a false conviction. To ground this example in actual
doctrine, imagine that the standards state two different tests for
illegal monopolization. One might be the “no economic sense test,”74
while the other could be “the equally efficient competitor test.”75 If
the cost of a Type I error is 0.25 and the cost of a Type II mistake is
0.20, then the expected error cost of the first standard is 0.65 and
the second is 0.70. The second standard is therefore preferable.76
This example provides a useful starting point, though it can be
criticized for conflating analysis under conditions of probability
with analysis under conditions of uncertainty.77 In the latter set-
ting, neither the probability nor the magnitude of all relevant effects
can be quantified with any expectation of accuracy.78 When proba-
bilities are known, all outcomes can be calculated and the optimal
rule can be identified and objectively verified.79 Unfortunately, the
probable occurrence and economic impact of much of the conduct
involved in antitrust disputes are not subject to such quantification.
Policymakers are therefore bereft of the relevant information.
Unable to judge the probability of Type I or Type II errors, as well
as their respective costs, how are judges, enforcement officials, and
academics to articulate optimal standards?
Although there could be a variety of conceivable answers, Judge
Easterbrook’s view has been the most influential in the last two
decades.80 He first suggests that the social costs of false condemna-
tions in antitrust law are apt to be severe.81 The erroneous rejection
of a consumer-welfare-enhancing practice eliminates the benefit
specificity with which such analysis can be conducted.
74. See Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The “No
Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 413 (2006).
75. See Ronald W. Davis, The Antitrust Division’s Report on Section 2: Firm Foundation
for Enforcement or a Bridge to Nowhere?, 23 ANTITRUST 42, 43, 49-50 n.15 (2008).
76. See Hylton, supra note 73.
77. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 60 (2009).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1-4.
81. Id. at 2.
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of that conduct for as long as the prohibitive rule persists.82 As he
puts it, “mistakes of law are not subject to competitive pressures.”83
Simultaneously, the erroneous ruling will foreclose beneficial con-
duct by others who would have employed the same or a closely
similar practice but now fear that their procompetitive behavior will
be mistakenly condemned as anticompetitive.84 Second, he posits
that, because most forms of collaborative behavior are efficient, a
judge who refuses to condemn challenged conduct of that kind is
more likely to be right than wrong.85 Third, he argues that the social
cost of a monopoly that is mistakenly allowed to persist is likely to
be less than the loss flowing from the improper condemnation of
efficient conduct.86
This view has proven persuasive to courts and many commenta-
tors in the United States, and has led to the adoption of a strong
anti-Type I error rule. But it would be a mistake to think that the
problems of incorporating error into antitrust analysis require—or
are amenable to—a single, objectively verifiable result. David Lewis,
the former head of the South African Competition Tribunal, has
representatively argued that the U.S. view on error is inapplicable
to the antitrust regime in his country.87 His experience suggests
that the basic premises behind the U.S. rule, namely that monopo-
lies are short-lived and markets are self-correcting, do not reflect
the historical performance of dominant firms and monopolized
82. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REV.
983, 986 (1987).
83. Id. (emphasis omitted).
84. Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 2.
85. Id. at 10. This point can be, and has been, extended to cases that involve unilateral
behavior as well.
86. See Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 2-3. Not all scholars accept Judge Easterbrook’s
position, however. Professor Williamson is the leading advocate of the opposing view, which
seeks to encapsulate all available information about each specific case before reaching a
conclusion. See Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 280 (1987). He
characterizes this analysis as a “legal process” approach, believing it to be superior to the
agnostic standard advocated by Judge Easterbrook. Id. at 271. A third approach has been
championed by Professors Salop and Romaine, who argue that expected error costs should be
explicitly addressed by the litigating parties and the court. See Steven C. Salop & Craig R.
Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 617, 671 (1999). The result of that analysis would then be incorporated into
the applicable liability standard. This view led them to articulate the influential
“unnecessarily restrictive conduct” test. Id. at 659.
87. See David Lewis, Chairperson, S. Afr. Competition Trib., Speech: Chilling Competition
2-4, available at http://www.icn-capetown.org.za/Publications/Speeches/lewis13.pdf.
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markets in South Africa.88 Europe has clearly eschewed the cautious
approach to intervention championed by the United States.89 These
examples suggest that error rules, like views about dominance and
markets, are contingent and reflect national and regional experience
and belief as much as, if not more than, they reflect economics. 
Notwithstanding international divergence, it remains true that
Judge Easterbrook’s policy views on error have been enormously
influential within the United States. In doubtful cases, the law
tends to err on the side of the defendant, permitting the challenged
conduct and trusting the market to work out any errors over time.90
In general, this translates into a relatively noninterventionist
antitrust policy that is skeptical of claims of anticompetitive effect.
We question whether this particular form of error analysis is
appropriate across the board. We believe that a one-size-fits-all bias
away from Type I errors is flawed.
2. Debunking Current Error Analysis
The current U.S. approach to error suffers from a number of
systemic, though unappreciated, flaws. First, the preference for
avoiding Type I errors rests in part on the premise that those errors
are (a) more costly, and (b) irreversible. These premises may be
mistaken, however, because neither has been subject to empirical
testing. And they are certainly contestable. In the first place, even
if any single Type I error is always more costly than a single Type
II error, what matters is the total social cost of all errors, not the
88. Id. at 3-4.
89. Recent cases in Europe make this clear. See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n
2004 E.C.R. II-4463; Eric S. Hochstadt, Note, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition
Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 316-27 (2002); Matthew Newman, Intel Fined $1.45 Billion in
EU Antitrust Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 13, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601110&sid=a22oQQl0woQI.
90. This is particularly so in the context of dominant-firm behavior. See, e.g., Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408, 414 (2004) (“We have
been very cautious in recognizing ... exceptions [to the right to refuse to deal].... Against the
slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a realistic assessment of its
costs. Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of § 2 ‘can be difficult’ ....
Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect....’ The cost of false positives
counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986); Ball Mem’l Hosp.,
Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1986).
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cost of any individual error or the relative costs of any two. If, for
every Type I error that courts commit, they make one and only one
Type II error, then Type I errors are obviously more costly to
society. If, however, for each Type I error, courts make ten of the
Type II variety, then the social calculus would certainly differ and
might differ by enough to counsel in favor of avoiding Type II
errors.91 
Second, the current default bias assumes that a Type I error
causes society to lose all the value of the competitive behavior
wrongly condemned. But this assumption cannot be true very often,
if ever. In the first place, firms foreclosed by judicial error from
adopting the very best behavior will adopt the next-best behavior,
or may even discover a superior one. The loss to society is the
difference in value between the best and the second-best—a
difference that can be very small or even positive. Further, it is
quite possible that the competitive behavior wrongly condemned
will not always be the optimal form of conduct—perhaps that best
behavior will not have been previously challenged, identified, or
contemplated, and will thus remain available. In those cases,
erroneous rulings might push firms from the second-best form of
conduct to the best and thus serve to create social gains. Finally, a
firm’s chosen course of action may not align with the social opti-
mum. For instance, a contemplated merger might promote con-
sumer welfare but be erroneously condemned. Yet vigorous
competition amongst incumbent firms to increase share and scale
may yield the same efficient economies while providing an extra
benefit in the form of price wars, innovation, service competition,
and output enhancement.
Third, the present heuristic mistakenly assumes that the harmful
effects of Type I errors are apt to be perpetual, as legal rules have
long lives and are not subject to erosion by competitive market
pressures. It is clear, however, that mistaken legal rules are not
irreversible. Stare decisis exerts a relatively weak gravitational pull
in the antitrust realm, in part because the Sherman Act is a classic
common law statute that leaves it to the judiciary to define optimal
91. In simple mathematical terms, the total social cost of error type equals x multiplied
by the total error cost, where x represents the number of times the particular kind of error
occurs during the relevant period. 
2010] ANTITRUST ERROR 99
competition policy.92 Bad precedents—and there have been many93—
have been reversed left and right.94 Yes, it has taken many years for
reversal to occur in some instances. But there are ways to avoid bad
precedent without directly overruling it. The per se rule against
product tying—a phenomenon generally regarded by economists as
more likely to be efficient than not—has never been overruled, but
it has been significantly truncated by requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant has monopoly power in the tying
market.95 The rule in Dr. Miles that barred resale price maintenance
was swiftly circumvented by a series of cases that established a de
facto right to engage in such behavior.96 
Current error analysis oversteps on a fourth basis. The contem-
porary, pro-defendant bias assumes that markets are always better
at correcting Type II errors than courts are at correcting Type I
errors. Maybe this is true some of the time, but it does not seem to
be true all of the time. Suppose, for example, that the D.C. Court of
Appeals had mistakenly allowed Microsoft to disadvantage Netscape
and Java.97 No “nascent” threat to Microsoft’s operating system
could have gotten off the ground. Yet even now, years into the “post-
corrective” period, there is still no effective challenger.98 Carl
Shapiro has written that remedies in this regard—in this case—
have proven woefully inadequate because they appear unable to
92. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
93. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (prohibiting maximum
resale price maintenance), overruled by State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); United States
v. Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 272-74, 277-78 (1966) (prohibiting a merger that would have
resulted in a mere 7.6 percent market share because there was then a trend toward
concentration in the market); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 404-
09 (1911) (finding minimum resale price maintenance illegal), overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S.
at 907. 
94. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907 (overruling Dr. Miles); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18-19,
22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 30, at 1-3
(articulating the modern view on merger analysis, which rejects the incipiency doctrine as
best represented in Von’s Grocery).
95. See Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210
(7th Cir. 1985).
96. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-27, 731 (1988);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761, 763-64 (1984); United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (allowing a manufacturer to cease selling to a dealer,
thus rendering Dr. Miles almost unenforceable).
97. In fact, the agencies permitted that to happen for a relatively long time. 
98. Google’s new operating system Chrome has recently entered the market, however.
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restore the competition lost by virtue of Microsoft’s misconduct.99 If
the market plus remedies could not wash out the competitive harm
caused by Microsoft, how can the market do it unaided in all other
cases? 
These objections—the ones we have just stated—have not been
coherently set forth in the “error” discussion to date. Nor are the
most recent events that implicate error analysis comforting. As this
Part has explained, many antitrust disputes require courts or
agencies to analyze behavior whose consequences are uncertain and
thus immeasurable. Error is very much at the heart of modern
competition law, whether one wishes to acknowledge it or not. We
now seek to locate our criticisms in context of recent events. In
particular, we consider the recent debacle involving the Justice
Department’s release and swift retraction of a report that focused
on the problem of error.100
3. The Section 2 Report Debacle
In an important sense, the Justice Department’s September 2008
report on Section 2 enforcement was animated by the problem of
error.101 The agency conducted an in-depth analysis of the legal
principles that govern unilateral conduct by dominant firms. The
report explored the potential for error inherent in applying that
body of law and recommended the adoption of a “disproportionality”
test that would reduce that potential.102 It concluded that only
where “anticompetitive effects are shown to be substantially dis-
proportionate to any associated procompetitive effects” would
antitrust enforcement be appropriate.103 In other words, close cases
—where Type I errors are more likely—would be resolved in favor
of defendants. Although this report was very controversial, drawing
scathing criticism from the FTC for its pro-defendant bias,104 it was
an earnest effort to approach the problem of error with rigor. 
99. See Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 740-41
(2009).
100. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra
note 6.
101. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1.
102. Id. at 45-46.
103. Id. at ix.
104. See Press Release, FTC, supra note 5.
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The report no longer exists. The new Justice Department wasted
little time in revoking the document, claiming that it would have
served to radically reduce antitrust oversight.105 In particular, Ms.
Varney rejected the disproportionality standard, believing the
proper question simply to be whether the anticompetitive effects of
a practice outweigh its procompetitive consequences.106 
Of course, Ms. Varney’s view is technically correct. But in prac-
tice, she is attempting the impossible. Under the rule of reason, one
must identify and weigh the various effects, actual and anticipated,
of a practice and define the legality of the conduct depending on the
outcome of that process.107 The inquiry’s accuracy depends on
correctly quantifying all the relevant consequences of the challenged
practice. Ms. Varney’s approach assumes away the recurring and
fundamental problem of quantifying effects that have not yet
occurred or that are otherwise impossible to measure. Her misun-
derstanding is confirmed by her assertion that, unlike her predeces-
sors, she and her staff can “separate the wheat from the chaff.”108
Those comments suggest that, on her watch, there will be no
erroneous determinations in enforcement decisions and that, hence,
there is no need for error rules. But Ms. Varney’s contention is
unsupportable. The problem of error is systemic and fundamental.
It will not go away, because it cannot. An antitrust policy built on
an imaginary, error-free world would be self-destructive.
We can do better than pretend that mistaken judgments can be
avoided. An intelligent approach to the problem of error might well
start with a skeptical view of rivals’ complaints. But a pro-defendant
bias need not evolve into an aversion to Type I errors in all cases.
The theoretical justifications for preferring Type II errors are
grounded in assumptions that do not always hold true. In certain
types of cases, the likely social costs of false negatives may exceed
the cost of false positives, particularly when adjusted for probability.
In others, courts should display greater sensitivity to the factors
that justify an aversion to Type I errors, especially in cases initiated
105. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6.
106. See Varney, supra note 13, at 8-9.
107. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375 passim (2009).
108. Varney, supra note 13, at 6.
102 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:075
by private plaintiffs, in which the threat of false negatives looms
large.109 Part II attempts to derive more nuanced error rules.
II. REVISITING ERROR ANALYSIS IN U.S. ANTITRUST LAW
A. Rules and Standards
We begin with a preliminary observation: for the past three
decades, U.S. antitrust law has been jettisoning rules in favor of
standards.110 How does this phenomenon implicate the law’s
vulnerability to mistaken aspersions of guilt or innocence?
The answer is counterintuitive. One focused on the importance of
error in antitrust analysis might applaud this contraction in the
use of rules. After all, will not all-encompassing assessments of
different practices minimize the incidence of error? And would not
inflexible, bright-line rules yield an unacceptable propensity for
mistaken determinations of liability? The more it scrutinizes the
challenged conduct, the more likely the court or agency is to reach
the correct result. In short, full-blown rule-of-reason analysis must
be preferable to categorical presumptions, which are in turn supe-
109. It should be noted that thus far we have not talked of what actually constitutes an
anticompetitive effect. This seemingly prosaic issue in fact masks a Pandora’s box of intricate
questions, unsettled law, and indeterminate analysis. Some illustrative challenges include:
Do prolonged price increases constitute antitrust harm, absent a showing of a restriction in
output? Over what time frame should price and output effects be considered for the purpose
of declaring them anticompetitive? Can negative repercussions today be offset by potential
gains tomorrow, thus rendering an otherwise anticompetitive practice innocuous? Can factors
other than price effects constitute objectionable outcomes, against which antitrust can and
should be employed? Can increasing concentration ever result in anticompetitive outcomes?
These questions represent but a fraction of the issues underlying the question of antitrust
harm. But the issue is fundamental, for unless antitrust adheres to an identifiable lodestar,
it is impossible to define false positives and negatives. See generally Hon. Richard D. Cudahy
& Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573634 (discussing and attempting to clarify anticompetitive effect).
110. For instance, prohibitions on resale price maintenance, product tying, below-cost
pricing, and price squeezes have all been abandoned. See supra note 92-94. Even the wisdom
of the quintessential rule of per se illegality, the absolute prohibition against horizontal price-
fixing, is now being questioned in some settings. See Randal C. Picker, Take Two: Stare
Decisis in Antitrust—The Per Se Rule Against Horizontal Price-Fixing 14-16 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper 2d Series, Working Paper No. 398, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113513.
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rior to per se condemnation. Thus, the Supreme Court’s retraction
of rules should be applauded.111
Yet, it is not so simple. While we conclude that rule-of-reason
analysis is more appropriate in certain instances—namely those
where the risk of error is slight—the greater the uncertainty
associated with the challenged behavior, the greater the case for an
appropriately biased rule or presumption. There is little to gain and
much to lose in asking a court to engage in an exhaustive market-
specific analysis of conduct with indeterminate long-run effects.112
The rule of reason, as applied to such behavior, often involves
intertemporal comparisons and necessarily relies on calculations
that are inherently imprecise. In such circumstances, mistakes are
inevitable. If one deems a practice to possess a far higher proclivity
for procompetitive than for anticompetitive effects, then stringent
judicial review is normatively desirable only if it carries a very low
likelihood of error. Put differently, standards work best when the
larger inquiry that they allow can turn up decisive information—at
reasonable cost. But when intertemporal comparisons are involved,
especially those involving the long term, decisive information is
never available, at any cost, and thus the larger inquiry will neces-
sarily be both very expensive and utterly futile. 
Nor do we advocate the reintroduction of per se rules, however.
Rather, appropriately constructed presumptions should generally
direct antitrust analysis. We find that the likelihood, magnitude,
and presence of error are far from homogeneous across case types
and business behaviors. Different forms of conduct are likely to give
rise to distinct risks of error, even if those risks cannot be precisely
quantified. As a result, there is good reason for antitrust law to
develop unique standards or rules for each.113 Part II.B attempts to
111. It bears noting, however, that although the Court has indeed jettisoned a variety of
pro-plaintiff rules in favor of standards, it has simultaneously espoused a limited number of
pro-defendant rules. In particular, the Court has clarified that a firm has a highly limited
duty to deal with its rivals. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109,
1119 (2009); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408-09
(2004).
112. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation, REGULATION,
Fall 2004, at 51.
113. It is impossible to articulate a general standard that can reliably guide the courts and
agencies in their assessment of all forms of commercial behavior. Any attempt to devise a
universal standard is bound to result in failure. This is due to the infinite complexity and
variety of economic factors at play in all cases. The only logically consistent rule that has ever
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demarcate the appropriate error analysis that should be applied to
the small number of business practices most likely to generate
error.114 
B. Constructing Behavior-Specific Error Rules
We illustrate our error analysis by briefly exploring a variety of
controversial business practices—controversial because their com-
petitive effects are much debated.115 We analyze the likely incidence
of Type I and II errors under each heading, and the cost of such
errors if they do arise. Through this analysis, we consider whether
the law’s current one-size-fits-all treatment is appropriate. We find
that the contemporary focus on avoiding Type I errors, though often
justified, should not enjoy ubiquitous application. Cases exist in
which the prospect of a significant benefit is so attenuated, and the
magnitude of that gain so trivial vis-à-vis the expected harm, that
the direction of the current default presumption should be revisited.
Nevertheless, we find that the default error rule of favoring false
negatives over false positives provides prudent guidance for much
been advocated involves eliminating antitrust enforcement altogether. See Milton Friedman,
The Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse, 21 CATO POL’Y REP. 6, 7 (1999). But garden-
variety standards are apt to be of limited use in this context as well. No one has ever been
able to craft a broad standard that provides even remotely useful or reliable means for
conducting analysis of unilateral behavior. Monopolization standards have been aptly
characterized as contradictory, intellectually vacuous, and circular. See Elhauge, supra note
45, at 255. For a more in-depth analysis by one of the authors, see Alan Devlin, Analyzing
Monopoly Power Ex Ante, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 153, 163-71 (2009).
114. If one wishes to adopt a broad guide to judging monopolization claims, the only useful
metric is to embrace a categorical presumption of legality. This is what the Justice
Department did in its 2008 Report, though we believe that the presumption it championed
—namely, no enforcement proceeding unless “anticompetitive effects are shown to be
substantially disproportionate to any associated procompetitive effects”—sets the bar too high
for agency enforcement. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at ix. As explored below, the
probability of some business practices bearing negative effects is greater than others.
Accordingly, a near-preclusive presumption, broadly applied, may find incongruous and
inappropriate application with respect to certain forms of conduct. We believe the best road
forward is to devise conduct-specific error rules and standards, rather than to attempt the
Sisyphean task of constructing a useful “macro” standard that will provide meaningful
guidance across all, or even most, forms of commercial conduct. Part II.B indicates how
representative forms of commercial behavior should be analyzed.
115. We do not seek to treat these forms of conduct in exhaustive detail, for each could
demand a full article in itself. 
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conduct, especially that which concerns the unilateral behavior of
dominant firms.
1. Merger Analysis
Amongst the diverse practices discussed in this Article, merger
policy may be one of the most vulnerable to error. In all other
cases, courts are required to cast judgment upon various forms of
past conduct. Price-fixing, refusals to deal, product tying, vertical
restraints, predatory pricing, reverse payments, and other forms of
potentially objectionable behavior are assessed under the antitrust
laws after their occurrence. Although some mergers are challenged
post-consummation,116 most are subjected to forward-looking anal-
ysis that attempts to predict the impact of the relevant acquisition
on future competition.117 This feature of merger review is one of
design, not accident. Section 7 of the Clayton Act is meant to arrest
anticompetitive acquisitions in their incipiency, before they mature
into full-fledged restraints of trade.118 Given the daunting episte-
mological limitations encountered by judges and juries attempting
to weigh the past, present, and future effects of prior conduct, one
need hardly strain to understand why prospective merger analysis
is even more problematic. The propensity of such analysis to result
in erroneous determinations is axiomatic.
Most mergers of note are subject to mandatory pre-merger filing
requirements established by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and enforced
by the agencies.119 In assessing whether a proposed acquisition may
result in a substantial lessening of competition, the FTC and DOJ
look to a variety of factors. These include market definition, the
impact of the merger on concentration in the identified market,
whether that concentration is likely to facilitate unilateral or coor-
dinated anticompetitive effects, and whether entry into the market
in response to presumptive post-merger price increases will be
116. See Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated
Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 41 (2004).
117. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (noting that
Section 7 is “a prophylactic measure, intended ‘primarily to arrest apprehended consequences
of intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil’” (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 568, 597 (1957))).
118. See E.I. du Pont, 353 U.S. at 589.
119. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006).
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timely, likely, and sufficient to bring prices down to pre-merger
levels.120 In certain instances, efficiencies will be incorporated into
the calculus, if they are likely to be passed onto consumers, merger-
specific, and sufficiently potent to prevent post-merger price
increases.121 The analysis has become increasingly sophisticated,
with the agencies relying on econometric studies of the market and
the merging parties’ impact upon the market and one another.122 
Although it would be unfair to deem the merger review process
random, there is no denying that the various steps outlined in the
agencies’ merger guidelines involve probabilistic and inexact cal-
culation.123 Moreover, some of the terms employed are susceptible
to multiple interpretations, and there is typically little direct evi-
dence of how the market would operate in the post-merger world.
Despite the undoubted expertise of the FTC and DOJ, the merger
review process is rife with potential for error.
Within the context of mergers, a Type I error occurs when an
acquisition that would not create a substantial lessening of com-
petition is prohibited. Conversely, a Type II error arises when an
anticompetitive merger is approved. The general U.S. bias in favor
of the latter would therefore aim to approve proposed acquisitions
in cases where enforcers could not ascertain their likely competitive
effects with a satisfactory degree of certainty.
Interestingly, merger assessment is one of the few areas of
competition policy where the law does not display a significant aver-
sion to Type I errors. Although the government must establish that
a merger will violate Section 7, the agencies face a lower threshold
of proof than they do with respect to claims of unilateral misconduct
by dominant firms. They need not show that a merger will carry a
dangerous probability of anticompetitive effect, or that such effect
is a near certainty, but must demonstrate only that such effect is
likely.124 It has been emphasized that the Clayton Act “is concerned
120. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, supra note 30, at 3, 30-32.
121. See Paul L. Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger Efficiencies: Reconsidering the “Passing-
On” Requirement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 735 (1996).
122. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 157-58 (2d ed. 2001).
123. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 9 (2010)
(recognizing “that precise and detailed information may be difficult or impossible to obtain”).
124. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). The FTC has been held
to an even lower evidentiary standard to obtain an injunction and proceed to an admin-
istrative hearing on the merits. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir.
2010] ANTITRUST ERROR 107
with probabilities, not certainties.”125 And in Section 7 cases, courts
generally prohibit merging parties from demonstrating that the
supply-side efficiencies generated by their combination will likely
outweigh any harm to consumer welfare. So-called “Williamson
mergers” are not presently countenanced, absent consumer pass-
on.126 In addition, it falls to the merging parties to present evidence
that post-consummation entry will remedy any potential anti-
competitive effect.127 In short, the government does not have to go
as far to make its case under Section 7 as it does under Section 2.
To conduct error analysis intelligently, one must weigh the
market’s likely reaction to false positives and negatives, respec-
tively. The primary concern with Type I errors is that they perpetu-
ate a loss that the market cannot undo. That critical assumption
does not hold true in merger clearance. If a Type I error occurs, then
by definition the planned combination was efficiency-enhancing
or, at the very least, efficiency-neutral. But mergers provide merely
one route to achieve optimal scale in a market. Internal growth will
generate precisely the same economies, as will certain joint ven-
tures. If a company wishes to merge in order to realize cost efficien-
cies, but is prohibited from doing so, it will seek to expand market
share as a second-best option. The social cost arises from the fact
that these benefits will be achieved somewhat later than would have
been possible through merger, but the fact remains that the market
can self-correct in reaction to Type I errors in this setting.128 And the
process of expanding within a market will generally benefit
consumers, as the relevant company increases output and decreases
price to expand share. This glaring point of distinction goes some
way to justifying a greater proclivity for Type I errors in merger
analysis than in other contexts.
But there is a complicating factor. The role of error analysis in
merger cases is in some respects unique because erroneous sanction
2008); see also Jessica Fricks, Note, FTC v. Whole Foods Markets: A New FTC Preliminary
Injunction Standard?, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J., 173 passim (2010).
125. See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 362 (2d Cir. 1982).
126. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 18-20 (1968); Yde & Vita, supra note 121, at 735.
127. See United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
128. It is notable too that many mergers raising antitrust questions turn out to be
inefficient and are undone. See, e.g., Richard Perez-Pena, Time Warner Plans To Spin Off
AOL, Ending Huge Deal That Failed, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B4. 
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decisions can be revisited. If agencies commit a Type II error, and
allow a merger to go ahead that results in anticompetitive effects,
the law permits them to revisit and condemn that merger after it is
consummated.129 As the Supreme Court has made clear, the govern-
ment has the right to act under Section 7 any time an acquisition
threatens to create a prohibited effect.130 The benefit of such ex post
analysis is that the court is free to look at post-merger evidence of
the acquisition’s actual effect on competition.131 Unfortunately, the
evidentiary capability of such backward-looking analysis is limited
in that it is typically of use only to the plaintiff.132
If the government can show that merger-specific output restric-
tions occurred in a setting that was not vulnerable to prompt self-
correction through entry, a violation of Section 7 follows.133 But
courts rarely allow defendants to point to an absence of post-
consummation anticompetitive effect. This is because potential
defendants could simply abstain from increasing price, pending
initiation of the government’s suit.134 Only where a defendant would
have no control over the relevant effect will such evidence be
admitted in its favor.135 A third party’s plans to enter the market
post-consummation would be a good example.
Thus, merger analysis may be atypically error-prone, but the
costs of error are probably slighter, more avoidable, and more evenly
balanced than in most other settings. As Type I and Type II errors
in this context can plausibly be seen as relatively slight, and
because there is no compelling a priori reason to expect one to be
worse than the other, one ought perhaps to revert to Bayesian
priors.136 In this regard, it may be preferable to err on the side of
Type I errors, by declining to approve mergers whose competitive
effects appear worrisome. If scale or scope efficiencies are indeed at
play, incumbent firms will expand market share and achieve a bit
later what the prohibited merger would have yielded a bit sooner.
Moreover, evidence of such efficiencies may become more apparent
129. And, of course, parties can propose to merge again later as well.
130. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957).
131. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506 (1974).




136. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 67 (2008).
2010] ANTITRUST ERROR 109
and thus be used to support a second merger review, where the first
resulted in a denial for want of proof of efficiencies. 
This approach may be thought of as superior to erring on the side
of Type II errors and challenging wrongfully approved mergers after
the fact. This is because an earlier sanction decision grants the
parties a shaky foundation upon which to conduct investment, as
they know that the agencies may come knocking on the door years
later if they decide they dislike the earlier merger. Ultimately ex
post attacks on consummated mergers, in addition to disturbing the
expectations of the merging parties, may impose painful social costs.
These include undoing efficiencies and the administrative cost
inherent in restructuring merged entities.
For these reasons, error analysis—despite not yielding determina-
tive answers—suggests an unusual openness to false positives. As
Part I explored, the market is not always incapable of correcting
Type I errors, nor are such errors necessarily greater than false
negatives when aggregated. Merger policy provides a good example
of why these oft-unappreciated considerations are important.
2. “Pay-for-Delay” Agreements
In recent years, there has been a wave of controversial agree-
ments in the pharmaceutical industry. Incumbent brand-name drug
manufacturers have been paying generic-producing rivals to stay
out of their markets, pending expiration of their patents.137 With the
exception of the Sixth Circuit,138 the courts have thus far found
these arrangements to be generally legal, believing that they fall
within the term of the exclusionary grant conferred by the patent.139
But the FTC has long condemned the practice—called “reverse
payments”—in forceful terms, alleging that it is plainly anticom-
petitive and results in massive wealth transfers from consumers
to pioneer drug producers.140 In a rare instance of interagency
137. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553, 1557 (2007).
138. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
139. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2003).
140. See, e.g., Paying Off Generics To Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Should
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divergence, in 2006, the DOJ and FTC adopted diametrically
opposed positions on the legality of reverse payments in separate
briefs filed with the Supreme Court.141 This divergence has recently
come to an end, as the new Justice Department has advised the
Second Circuit that it now considers reverse-exclusionary agree-
ments to be potentially illegal.142 Congress is considering whether
to prohibit the practice by legislative fiat.143 
Antitrust analysis of these agreements is difficult, particularly in
light of the fact that horizontal market-sharing agreements are
usually per se illegal.144 Such arrangements are viewed as having
such a low propensity for long-run benefit and such a large probabil-
ity of immediate and potential harm that they can safely be
condemned. Some Type I errors may occur, but they are likely to be
so sporadic that concerns of judicial economy should normally
prevail. Market-sharing agreements are therefore condemned
without further inquiry, thus minimizing false negatives, which
seems appropriate given the extremely low risk of false positives.145 
Reverse payments in the pharmaceutical industry involve patent
protection, which complicates analysis. As there is yet no settled
view of the liability issues, no single approach to error analysis of
this conduct has emerged. Nevertheless, these arrangements are
classic candidates for rules, as opposed to standards. The circum-
stances at issue in every reverse payment case are likely to be
similar. In most cases, the question will be whether a facially valid
and infringed patent grants its owner the right to pay a potential
It Be Prohibited?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6-9 (2007)
(statement of Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, FTC); Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, FTC, Concurring
Statement of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz: Federal Trade Commission v. Watson
Pharmaceuticals et al. 1 (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090202
watsonpharm.pdf. Notably, in January 2010, the agency released a study finding that pay-for-
delay agreements cost U.S. consumers $3.5 billion per year. See FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW
DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
141. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f216300/216358
.pdf.
142. See Diane Bartz, Justice Dept. Says Reverse Payments Illegal, REUTERS, July 6, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssHealthcareNews/idUSN0628839320090707.
143. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 29(a) (2009).
144. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1967).
145. See id. at 357; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 596, 598-99
(1951).
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infringer to stay out of the market during the term of the patent.
The specific market will change from case to case, but the economic
effects of the chosen rule will not. 
In formulating the better rule, one must consider the nature of
Type I and Type II errors, as well as the perceived probability of
each arising under the different per se rules. One must also ask how
the market will react to such mistaken determinations. In particu-
lar, can the market find a way to self-correct in the presence of false
positives?
The kind of error at issue differs from those previously discussed
in this Article. The danger in reverse-payment cases is first that a
court will permit the practice in circumstances in which a Markman
hearing146 or trial would reveal that the patent was either not
infringed or invalid (a Type II error). Alternatively, a court might
condemn such an agreement in circumstances when the patent
would have been proved both valid and infringed (a Type I error).
This danger is unique, because error analysis usually focuses on the
expected frequency and magnitude of mistaken determinations of
anticompetitive effect, not patent validity. In the case of reverse
payments, anticompetitive effect is necessarily present. They in-
volve, after all, market-sharing agreements whose effects are well-
known and have always been condemned as per se illegal. The only
issue is whether those invidious effects are subsumed within the
lawful monopoly inherent in a patent grant.
Perhaps the most important question, therefore, in reverse
payment cases is whether the relevant patents are likely to be found
valid and infringed. Empirical evidence suggests that patentees’
chances of success in such proceedings are mixed. Recent studies
have found that challenged patents are invalidated at rates between
42 and 50 percent.147 In 2006, Professor Paul Janicke and LiLan Ren
146. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
147. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (observing that nearly 50 percent of all litigated
patents are struck down); Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s
Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 154-56 (1995); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark
Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L.
& ECON. 45, 59 (2004) (finding that win rates are close to 50 percent in patent cases); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution,
11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37-38 (2004) (finding that patent owners succeed about 30 percent
of the time at the Federal Circuit and suggesting that the availability of injunctive relief
explains the departure from a 50 percent success rate); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries,
112 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:075
found that once validity, noninfringement, and enforceability are
considered, “accused patent infringers have been winning patent
infringement suits at a rate of three to one.”148 Although there may
be an element of selection bias present in such studies, the results
are telling nonetheless.
Whether reverse-exclusionary agreements are to be approved or
condemned thus turns on how likely pharmaceutical patents are to
be valid. The empirical evidence suggests that it may be question-
able to presume that the patent underlying a reverse-exclusionary
agreement is valid. This would weigh strongly against a rule
allowing pay-for-delay settlements in all cases. But neither does the
empirical evidence suggest that pharmaceutical patents are more
likely than not to be invalid.
One way to resolve the dilemma is to look to the text of the Patent
Act.149 Congress decreed that all patents issued by the U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office are to enjoy a presumption of validity.150 Of
course, the preceding empirical evidence questions the normative
basis for such a presumption. But if a court cannot discern through
a hearing that the subject patent appears invalid or unlikely to be
infringed, then that determination in conjunction with the presump-
tion of validity suggests the legality of the reverse payment.151 
The rule we counsel, which is the one adopted by the majority of
courts that have considered reverse payments,152 will inevitably
result in some Type II errors. It is worth considering how the
market is likely to react to such erroneous determinations, and to
and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000)
(taking a sample of 1151 cases over the period from 1983-1999 and finding that patentees won
58 percent of cases).
148. See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 3 (2006).
149. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102, 119, 161, 172 (2006).
150. See id. § 282.
151. Congress is currently considering a bill that would prevent pioneer drug
manufacturers from entering into agreements with generic producers, which would result in
the transfer of anything of value from the former to the latter. If enacted, this would prohibit
all forms of settlement in this environment. But, as Judge Richard Posner has commented,
“[s]omething is wrong” with a patent system that would require a patentee to litigate all
claims of invalidity or noninfringement to decision. See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm.,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991-94 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
152. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1334-37
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208, 209 & n.22, 210-
13 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066-68 (11th Cir. 2005).
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compare that reaction with its likely response to the false positives
that would accompany the preclusive rule supported by the
enforcement agencies.
If a court—or Congress—condemns a reverse-exclusionary ar-
rangement when the patent would have been found valid and
infringed, the effect is in some respects analogous to a taking.153 The
economic effects are straightforward. By imposing such costs on a
worthy inventor, the law diminishes the incentives to invent and
commercialize that animate the patent system. If this mistaken
determination is applied to all cases as a rule, that is, a per se ban
on reverse payments, the result will be a systemic reduction in
incentives to innovate. In the pharmaceutical markets, in which
innovation rather than price is the key to long-term social value,
such harm may be severe.154 
How will the market react to such a Type I error? The only
plausible alternative is for pioneer drug makers to enter into
settlement agreements without paying for delay. But without an
ability to make such a payment, what else of value can the brand-
name producer offer the generic producer that would induce it not
to enter? Not much. The first ANDA-filer to submit a paragraph-IV
certification commits an act of infringement but does not engage in
active sales.155 Damages are therefore nominal. In such a setting, a
generic entrant has comparatively little to gain, and a lot to lose in
terms of foregone profit from generic sales, in settling without
receiving a large financial incentive. And patentees have little
reason to provide such capital without a quid pro quo, the obvious
candidate for which is delay.156 Thus, absent a right to “pay for
delay,” pioneer drug manufacturers may not be able to settle these
lawsuits. The market would therefore not seem capable of cor-
recting Type I errors that systemically undercompensate deserving
patentees by wrongly denying them an ability to pay potential
infringers not to infringe.
153. The distinction, of course, is that far from receiving market value for its property, the
patentee bears the full cost of defending its patent’s validity and establishing its proper claim
construction. This is a cost for which the patentee will not be compensated.
154. See generally Barnett, supra note 32, at 859-61.
155. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2003)
(summarizing the Abbreviated New Drug Application filing, certification, and thirty-month
stay provisions for generic drug makers and pioneer patentholders).
156. See Asahi, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991-94.
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There is consequently much to fear from Type I errors in this
setting, at least if one posits the close relationship between innova-
tion and exclusivity—the so-called Schumpeterian competition of
creative destruction.157 The market can react to Type II errors in a
different way. If pay-for-delay agreements are allowed when based
on facially valid and infringed patents, the result will be patentee
overcompensation. A per se legal rule would transform a probabilis-
tic property right into a certain one, permitting brand-name
pharmaceutical companies to derive greater value than contem-
plated by the patent bargain.158 Some patents that would have been
found invalid or not infringed will continue to enjoy exclusive force.
Generic drugs that would otherwise have entered the market
promptly will be delayed until the expiration of the pioneer patent.
Consumers will therefore lose as a result.159
Putting aside the presumption of patent validity, which tilts the
balance of the debate toward permissibility, comparative error
analysis would support Type II errors over Type I with regard to
reverse payments. The cost of the former is limitedgeneric entry
will eventually occur, and patentee overcompensation, imperfect as
it is, will at least incentivize innovation, which is the ultimate
source of long-run consumer welfare. Type I errors threaten to
dilute the crucial incentives to invent and commercialize that
underlie the pharmaceutical industry.
That Type I mistakes are more costly might suggest that the
optimal rule for reverse payments is per se legality. The alternative
rule—automatic illegality—may be considered inferior under the
preceding error analysis. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the
former rule is the correct one. Society is not forced to choose
between two extreme alternatives. Yes, individual Type I errors are
likely to be more harmful than Type II mistakes, but that fact would
dictate the optimal rule only if we had to operate in an environment
of complete uncertainty. With respect to reverse payments, however,
157. There is an important, though never-ending, debate among scholars concerning the
question of whether competition or monopoly is the best driver of long-run innovation. See,
e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 577-89 (2007).
158. For one of the author’s larger view on this point, see Alan Devlin, The Stochastic
Relationship Between Patents and Antitrust, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 75, 77-81, 106-09
(2009).
159. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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we do have some valuable information that may allow us to craft
more nuanced rules. 
Specifically, society can greatly reduce the incidence of false
negatives (allowing reverse payments when the underlying patent
is invalid or not infringed) by accepting some slightly larger
incidence of false positives (banning reverse payments when the
underlying patent is valid and infringed). To achieve this, courts
should err on the side of permissibility and prohibit reverse
agreements only when serious questions arise as to the patent’s
validity or reach, or when the agreement has effects beyond the
scope of the patent.160 Each of these determinations will bear some
prospect for error by mistakenly condemning what should have been
a valid exclusionary right. And each such false positive is more
harmful than each mistaken determination in the opposite direc-
tion. But a per se rule will result in a number of Type II errors
that swamp Type I mistakes. A more scrutinizing approach would
entertain greater risk of the latter to facilitate a disproportionate
reduction in false negatives. Thus, the socially optimal rule does not
turn on a simple determination that Type II errors are to be
preferred to Type I, but on a more complex inquiry into the relation-
ship between the two. 
Pursuant to this more nuanced error analysis, we believe that the
optimal approach is to allow pay-for-delay settlements when the
patent appears valid and infringed and when the agreement does
not create a negative external effect, such as frustrating potential
entry by third-party generic manufacturers. This approach, which
declines to allow all reverse payments, would result in some false
positives in application. But the concomitant reduction in Type II
errors is likely to swamp the occasional effect of a reverse agree-
ment wrongly condemned, given the former’s expected relative
frequency and cumulative impact. 
160. It is appropriate to ban a pay-for-delay settlement when the agreement appears to
exceed the scope of the patent, such as in In re Cardizem, in which the first ANDA-filer agreed
not to license the 180-day period of first-mover exclusivity. See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at
902, 907-08.
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3. Refusals To Supply
Refusals to supply cast the tension between the long run and
short run into critical relief, creating a quandary for antitrust
enforcers. Requiring a dominant firm to share its IP or physical
“essential facility” with rivals may facilitate “viable” competition by
allowing those rivals to compete on an equal basis with the monopo-
list. In the short term, this competition will surely result in lower
prices and hence greater consumer welfare. These unequivocal
effects make interoperability, compulsory licensing, and other
interventionist remedies extremely tempting to antitrust enforcers
who dislike prevailing monopoly conditions. But the intervention
comes at a possible cost. Economics indicates that compulsory
licensing reduces the value of invention to a successful innovator,
and therefore diminishes the incentive to innovate in the first
place.161 An antitrust regime that insists upon an unconcentrated
market structure may myopically foreclose dynamic efficiency that
is of far greater long-term value to consumers than short-term price
competition. Of course, in order to identify the optimal rate of
intervention in monopoly markets, enforcers must be capable of
measuring and comparing the beneficial short-run effects of
interoperability against future costs from distorted incentives.
Once again, determinations of liability with respect to a monopo-
list’s refusal to supply are highly vulnerable to error. False positives
will condemn a dominant firm for refusing to license its IP, physical
infrastructure, or other form of property when social welfare would
be maximized by respecting the firm’s licensing decisions. False
negatives would permit a monopolist to exclude rivals when
licensing would promote long-run consumer welfare. Here, we
believe that the prevailing U.S. rule is the correct one. Under
modern antitrust law, a property owner has an almost absolute
right to exclude others.162 The law therefore avoids Type I errors and
accepts some Type II mistakes. 
161. See Yannis S. Katsoulacos, Optimal Legal Standards for Refusals To License
Intellectual Property: A Welfare-Based Analysis, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 269, 282-83
(2009); Aaron K. Perzanowski, Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1549, 1558-60 (2009).
162. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407-09
(2004); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1214-20 (9th Cir. 1997).
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The process of innovation is not yet fully understood, but a
powerful correlation seems to exist between strong property rights
and commercial invention.163 When a company refuses to share its
intellectual or physical property with a rival, it exercises the power
to exclude, which defines a property right. By intruding upon that
right, antitrust authorities wade into dangerous waters. If a suc-
cessful innovator cannot reap the fruits of its invention, the crucial
incentives that drove that innovation yesterday may be absent
tomorrow. The cost of such an outcome is apt to be far larger than
the short-run monopoly prices associated with exclusivity. As the
Supreme Court emphasized in Trinko, incursions into even a
monopolist’s property are to be undertaken rarely and only when
regulators have confidence that the harm to incentives will be
outweighed.164 As the Court aptly pointed out, the propensity for
error that plagues this inquiry usually forecloses any prospect of
antitrust liability for a refusal to deal.165
We have explained elsewhere why interoperability is rarely an
appropriate antitrust response to monopoly conditions.166 But a duty
to deal might reasonably be imposed when it would not appear to
injure long-run incentives disproportionately vis-à-vis the short-run
gain sought to be achieved. One situation that might fall under this
category would be when a dominant company used to deal with a
rival but subsequently ceases to do so for a reason that cannot be
tied to a change in the market. In such a case, the prior course of
dealing presumably existed because it was mutually beneficial. A
subsequent refusal to deal, if it effectively eliminates a competitor’s
ability to compete and thus harms consumers, may result in short-
run losses that are to be measured against an attenuated risk to
future incentives. Such was the situation in Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., in which the Court found a dominant
ski operator liable under Section 2 for cutting off a long-standing
cooperative arrangement with the owner of a rival mountain.167 In
163. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patents and Growth: Empirical Evidence from the
States, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1470-79, 1486-89, 1516-17 (2009).
164. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09.
165. See id.
166. See Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs & Bruno Peixoto, Success, Dominance, and
Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157, 1161, 1179-200 (2009).
167. 472 U.S. 585, 589-95, 601, 605-11 (1985). Even this rule can be questioned, however,
given that it creates a disincentive for dominant companies to begin cooperating with rivals
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this setting, the risk of a serious Type I error is much reduced by
demonstrable evidence that prior courses of dealing were mutually
profitable. Denying dominant firms their right to exclude in such a
context is distinctly less likely to carry with it a risk of a significant
diminution in incentives. 
4. Predatory Pricing
Courts must often make crucial distinctions between procom-
petitive and anticompetitive conduct. But in many circumstances
the two are difficult to distinguish. Nowhere is this tension more
obvious than with respect to predatory pricing. At its most basic
level, antitrust policy is designed to spur vigorous price com-
petition.168 Low prices are good prices. One would thus expect claims
of excessive price-cutting to be met with skepticism. And indeed
they are.169 But although most instances of below-cost selling are apt
to be irrational, given their weak ability to yield or maintain a
monopoly,170 the economic literature suggests that predatory pricing
could be a rational tactic in some circumstances,171 particularly
when dominant firms set prices below their costs in an effort to
eliminate new competitors in their incipiency.172
The potential for error is palpable in the sphere of predatory
pricing. The relevant metric by which to judge the optimality of
price is marginal cost.173 Under perfect competition, the two will be
in the first place. And the precedent established in a narrow case can easily mutate into
support for more invasive intervention in the future. In Trinko, the Court characterized Aspen
as being “at or near” the outer boundaries of Section 2 liability, a result that strikes us as
entirely correct. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
168. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 319
(2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224, 226
(1993).
169. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)
(“[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition. Thus,
mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”).
170. See POSNER, supra note 122, at 208-11.
171. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy,
88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241, 2243-50 (2000).
172. See POSNER, supra note 122, at 208-11.
173. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700-03, 716 (1975).
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equal.174 It is widely agreed that no firm, even a monopolist, should
be punished for reducing price below that of a rival, as long as that
price is equal to or above its own marginal cost.175 This holds true
even if the dominant firm can efficiently adopt an above-marginal-
cost price that is below the marginal cost of its rivals, and thus force
them from the market.176 Unfortunately, marginal cost is effectively
impossible to calculate in practice.177 Hence, the first source of
concern for courts in predatory pricing cases: how are they to tell
whether a given price is below or above cost for purposes of the rule?
Academics and the judiciary have struggled to formulate an
appropriate proxy for marginal cost. The best candidate yet devised
is long-run average cost, which is calculable. This measure was
derived from the Areeda-Turner test, which uses short-run average
variable cost as a surrogate for marginal cost.178 Pricing above short-
run average variable cost is per se lawful,179 except perhaps in the
Ninth Circuit, which has held that prices in excess of average total
cost are not immune from antitrust scrutiny.180 
Notwithstanding these accepted principles, constructing an ap-
propriate measure of cost is a complex undertaking that is obviously
subject to error. An erroneous determination that a defendant’s
price is below its short-run average variable cost can lead to a
wrongful conviction. Courts seek to minimize this risk by relying on
increasingly sophisticated evidence, typically provided by expert
economists.
But calculating the relationship between price and cost in a
particular case is only part of the battle. A finding that a dominant
174. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 387, 398 (2008).
175. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)
(“[W]e have rejected ... the notion that above-cost prices ... inflict injury to competition
cognizable under the antitrust laws.”).
176. See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681
(2003).
177. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003).
178. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 173, at 716-18.
179. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234-35 (1st Cir.
1983); MCI Commc’ns v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1114 (7th Cir. 1983); Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T
Co., 651 F.2d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280, 403-04 (1984). 
180. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983). It is questionable that this opinion survives Brooke Group,
however.
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firm did indeed set price below cost should not—and in the United
States does not—by itself result in an antitrust violation.181
Companies regularly set price below cost for a wide variety of
legitimate reasons.182 All firms, monopolists or otherwise, may
rationally introduce a new product at below-cost prices to induce
customer switch-over and rapid uptake. This phenomenon is apt to
be particularly common in network industries, in which strong
positive externalities in consumption are present.183 Companies may
give certain products away for free for promotional purposes, or may
include certain goods in a bundle—perhaps at no additional cost to
the consumer—to render the tying product more attractive to the
marginal purchaser. And rivals may simply engage in all-out price
wars that result in their making sub-marginal-cost sales in a bid to
capture market share and the attendant scale economies. Only
rarely will below-cost pricing create dangers for long-term consumer
welfare.184
A blanket prohibition of below-cost selling would result in an
unacceptable number of Type I errors, as consumer-friendly price
cuts would be condemned in circumstances in which no long-term
threat to economic efficiency exists. Importantly, the market would
not be able to create a desirable solution to false positives. A ban
on sub-marginal-cost selling would simply prevent companies,
especially large and efficient ones, from engaging in fierce price
competition. Fearful of being found liable under the antitrust laws,
companies would temper their behavior and raise prices, at signif-
icant cost to consumers.
If a rule was appropriate, then it would be one of per se legality.
Indeed, this position has been promoted by the Chicago School,
which characterized predatory pricing as inherently irrational.185
On its view, a predator would first have to suffer losses on an
181. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24
(1993); C. Scott Hemphill, Note, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1582-85 (2001).
182. See Bolton et al., supra note 171, at 2281-82.
183. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS, AND MICROSOFT:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 14-16, 109-12 (2001); Bolton et al., supra
note 171, at 2281-82.
184. See POSNER, supra note 122, at 208-09.
185. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-55 (1993); Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979) (describing the basic
features of the Chicago School).
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increasing volume of sales in order to monopolize a market, and
would then have to increase and maintain price at supracompetitive
levels long enough to render the operation profitable. But the
presence of monopoly profits would entice entry, which would deny
the predator the ability to recoup losses. Knowing this ex ante, few
companies would embark on a predatory pricing campaign.186 
Such skepticism has permeated through to substantive doctrine.
The Supreme Court has characterized predatory pricing as a
practice “rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”187 But the
Court has sensibly eschewed translating that skepticism into a
bright-line rule. Post-Chicago economic models conclude that below-
cost pricing may be a rational method of excluding an equally or
more efficient competitor in certain, narrow circumstances.188 If
correct, these models suggest that a rule of per se legality would
carry a propensity for Type II errors and would immunize below-cost
predation that poses a significant threat to long-term competition.189
A per se legal rule would allow such monopolists to perpetuate their
position against potentially superior opposition. Although dominant
firms’ ability to exclude entry in the long run would be limited,
given the availability of capital to enter markets in which monopoly
power is present, the delay created by below-cost predation is itself
objectionable.
The law reacts to this fact by injecting a requirement that the
plaintiff prove a “dangerous probability of recoupment,” in addition
to the existence of below-cost pricing, for a violation of Section 2 to
follow.190 This standard, which unquestionably tilts the balance
toward the defendant in predatory pricing suits, seeks to ensure
that mistaken determinations of sub-marginal-cost pricing will not
result in false convictions. It also ensures that actual instances of
below-cost pricing will not be condemned unless there is good reason
186. See BORK, supra note 185, at 149-55.
187. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
188. See McChesney, supra note 9, at 1414-15.
189. As noted above, theory indicates that predatory pricing is likely to be rational only
when a company already holds a monopoly and seeks to eliminate fringe rivalry. See POSNER,
supra note 122, at 208-09.
190. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 319-20
(2007). This, of course, is in addition to the required showing of monopoly power in all
monopolization cases taken under Section 2. The requirement of significant market power
immunizes behavior by fringe firms, as they cannot unilaterally impact the market in a
negative way.
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to believe that the conduct will result in economic distortions that
the market will not correct.191 In practice, this translates into a
requirement that the market in which the predation takes place be
characterized by significant entry barriers that will prevent the
arrival of timely, likely, and sufficient competition.
We find the law’s approach to predatory pricing to be most
sensible. Given the grave potential for Type I errors in this area,
and the unacceptable cost of such errors were they to materialize,
the courts are right to erect significant obstacles for plaintiffs who
allege such behavior. Nevertheless, the propensity for Type II errors
persists. Because a standard can be formulated that largely
excludes the possibility of serious errors of both the false negative
and positive varieties, a rule in either direction is likely inferior.
5. Vertical Distribution Contracts, Integration, and Product
Tying
Vertical restrictions, integration, and product tying—all closely
related phenomena—have long confounded the courts. These prac-
tices implicate the manner in which a manufacturer arranges for its
goods to be delivered to consumers and, in the case of tying, how
sellers present those goods to purchasers. As one might imagine,
vertical contracts, integration, and tie-ins are common in developed
economies.192 Yet, for a variety of reasons, antitrust has long taken
a dim view of such conduct. 
All three forms of behavior—vertical restraints, integration, and
product tying—are generally good candidates for the basic error
treatment in which the law seeks to avoid Type I errors. This is
primarily due to the voluminous empirical and theoretical liter-
ature that indicates that such behavior is more often than not pro-
191. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-27
(1993) (discussing market power, below-cost pricing, and what characterizes a “dangerous
probability” of recoupment).
192. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 77; David S. Evans & Michael Salinger,
Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying
Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 39-42 (2005); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Two Tales of Bundling:
Implications for the Application of Antitrust Law to Bundled Discounts 1-4 (George Mason
Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 05-27, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=796432.
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competitive.193 But it is also because the required comparisons are
not only intertemporal much of the time, but are also intermarket.194
Resale price maintenance has implications for both inter- and
intrabrand competition, but these effects are rarely comparable.
Assessing the net welfare costs of vertical integration involves a
trade-off between definite short-run efficiency and possible long-run
loss through diminished competition or foreclosure caused, in the
unknowable future, by rivals’ higher costs.195 Bundling and require-
ments contracts necessitate the consideration of tying and tied
markets, as well as the short- and long-run effects of the conduct in
each. And all involve some consideration of future barriers to entry,
as well as consumer demand.196
These factors are neither commensurate nor comparable.197 As a
result, subjecting these arrangements to full-blown rule-of-reason
analysis is both wasteful and counterproductive:198 an inquiry into
practices with immeasurable and incomparable effects will be
fruitless, irrespective of whether it is cursory or exhaustive. As
noted, there is strong theoretical and empirical evidence that these
forms of vertical conduct are generally procompetitive.199 This might
suggest the primacy of a rule, but per se legality will certainly result
in numerous Type II errors given the economic literature that points
to cases in which tying, integration, and vertical restrictions may
generate negative effects.200 When a manufacturer has genuine
monopoly power, tie-ins can delay entry by requiring rivals to enter
in multiple markets simultaneously.201 Certain vertical restrictions
may raise the cost of entry by denying potential upstream competi-
193. See, e.g., Christian Ahlborn et al., The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per
Se Illegality, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 287, 287-305, 318-29 (2004).
194. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 403 n.4 (2009) (citing scholarship in support of the
“single monopoly profit theory”).
195. See Posner, supra note 185, at 936-38.
196. See id. at 933-48 (discussing the similarities and differences of the Chicago and
Harvard Schools and barriers to entry).
197. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 155-56 (1984).
198. Id.
199. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. Recent literature suggests that such monopolists may in fact be able to bypass the
“single monopoly profit” constraint. See Elhauge, supra note 194, at 399-401, 403-20.
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tors access to an efficient distribution network. Vertical integration
by an upstream monopolist can produce an analogous effect.
Given that courts are vulnerable to Type I errors in this setting,
and given the probability and large relative cost of such mistakes,
plaintiffs should face a significant burden to establish an antitrust
violation. The most obvious appropriate impediment to recovery
would be a showing of monopoly power. U.S. law has adopted such
a requirement, but its definition of “monopoly” in this setting is too
lax. Firms with less than 50 percent market share can be found to
occupy a dominant position,202 but the power over price normally
associated with such a share is usually insufficient to create a
meaningful threat to competition. As one of the authors has ex-
plained elsewhere, a firm engaged in product tying, or another form
of vertical behavior, needs a near monopoly to succeed.203 The courts
should also require plaintiffs to show that the impugned conduct
has led to an actual reduction in output, or that it has created a
dangerous probability of one in the future. In settings in which
courts cannot confidently identify the competitive effects of vertical
integration, restrictions, or tying arrangements, they should treat
the conduct under review as consistent with the antitrust laws.
6. Should Certain Instances of Price-Fixing Be Analyzed Under
the Rule of Reason?
We complete our extrapolation of behavior-specific error rules by
briefly exploring an area of law in which the pro-Type I-error bias
is properly reversed. The relevant question is whether certain
instances of horizontal price-fixing should be analyzed under a
broad standard rather than a prohibitive rule. As noted above, rules
are almost by definition error-prone in that they tend to be either
over- or underinclusive.204 Hence, the per se prohibition of horizontal
price-fixing is virtually certain to result in at least some erroneous
condemnations of welfare-enhancing price fixes. 
202. See Hayden Publ’g Co. v. Cox Broad. Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 69 n.7 (2d Cir. 1984).
203. See Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product Tying, 44 AM. BUS.
L.J. 521, 530-32 (2007).
204. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1541, 1551 (2009).
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The case of cartels is interesting because it demonstrates that
U.S. antitrust law’s predilection toward false negatives is not
absolute. In cases in which the long-run benefits of a practice are
construed as vague, distant, and improbable, but its immediate
negative effects are both serious and likely, the law foregoes inquiry
into whether free-market processes might remedy short-run harm.
Horizontal collusion regarding price or market allocation is the
prime example. 
It has long been a threshold principle of competition law that
such cartel activity is illegal without regard to reasonableness,
intent, or other extenuating circumstances.205 Such collusion—
consistently regarded as the prime evil against which antitrust is
directed206—leads to output restrictions, price increases, deadweight
loss, allocative inefficiency, and diminished aggregate welfare.207
Collusion not only results in an unwarranted wealth transfer from
consumers to producers, but it also diminishes the net wealth of
society by reducing the number of transactions that take place in
the economy.208 At their most fundamental level, cartel-driven price
increases are tantamount to theft.209
Despite these well-established bases for condemning horizontal
price-fixing, such arrangements are not necessarily devoid of
benefit.210 Ruthless price competition drives inefficient companies
from the market, which is the cost of an efficiency-driven application
205. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-50 (1990) (per curiam); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927).
206. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
207. See generally POSNER, supra note 122, at 9-32.
208. See id. at 22-23; Maurice E. Stucks, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
443, 444-48, 476-78.
209. This is the position taken by some Member States of the European Commission when
enforcing their laws against cartels. See Julian Joshua, The European Cartel Enforcement
Regime Post-Modernization: How Is It Working?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2006).
However, among antitrust enforcers around the world, a “gulf” exists between the criminal-
theft view and the economic-phenomena view. See Julian M. Joshua et al., Extradition and
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Cartel Enforcement’s Global Reach, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 353,
359 (2008).
210. Benefits are most likely under so-called “semi-collusion.” See Russell W. Cooper &
Thomas W. Ross, Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 31, 34
n.10 (2009); see also Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust
Law: Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing To Account for the Special Features of Auction
Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 99-100 (2004) (noting that collusion by poorly informed
bidders can have social benefits).
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of competition law. But in atypical cases of supply shocks, severe
recession, or banking crises, otherwise successful, innovative, and
dynamic firms may be unable to survive in the presence of unforgiv-
ing price-cutting. The failure of such companies would result in
reduced employment, lost investment, and enhanced ex post market
power. It is conceivable, at least at the level of theory, that efficient
firms in a competitive market could enhance their viability, and
thus provide some stability to the larger economy, by agreeing to set
prices at an appropriate level in a time of severe economic contrac-
tion.211 
Such collusion could be normatively justified in other settings too,
including when sellers react collectively to monopsonistic power. In
these settings, the dominant manufacturer in a market may be able
to drive down the price at which it buys inputs to sub-marginal-cost
levels, which would result in downstream and upstream distor-
tions.212 By agreeing to act collectively, sellers could counteract the
purchaser’s buying power and bring price closer to the competitive
level, with net benefits for society.
Nevertheless, antitrust law properly blinds itself to the possibility
of such benefits, and seeks instead to condemn any and all instances
of collusion. The law arrives at this conclusion not because it denies
the existence of potentially offsetting benefits, but because those
gains are apt to arise so infrequently that the law can more
efficiently assume that collusion is always harmful. The per se rule
is, of course, a cost-saving heuristic.213 But it is one appropriately
skewed in favor of Type I errors. Here the law is willing to accept an
isolated number of false positives, correctly observing that the price
of a non-per se rule would be an unacceptable number of false
negatives.214
211. Of course, the proper price would not be the “monopoly” price, which would serve to
exacerbate the recession’s effect. A more reasonable price would be one that would stave off
insolvency by preventing prices from falling to marginal cost when the affected companies
bear considerable sunk costs.
212. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
107-10 (4th ed. 2005).
213. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977). 
214. Interestingly, the law’s embrace of Type I errors in the case of cartels is not without
criticism. Indeed, there is a movement currently afoot to remove certain instances of
horizontal price-fixing from the category of per se illegal practices. In a working paper,
Professor Picker highlights horizontally imposed vertical rules, which involve distributors
agreeing among themselves on a minimum price and persuading the relevant manufacturer
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C. Putting Faith in the Agencies? Prosecutorial Discretion as a
Facilitator of a Permissive Rule
The preceding discussion indicates that error analysis can and
should adopt a more nuanced approach than its current one-size-
fits-all heuristic in favor of Type I errors. Different forms of conduct
yield distinct tendencies toward false positives and false negatives,
the respective costs of which will necessarily be context specific. 
The vast spectrum of real-life commercial behavior does not lend
itself to reliable analysis by a single test. Courts, enforcers, and
academics have struggled to articulate one that judges can use to
distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct.215 No test
yet devised comes close to satisfying this purpose.216 Nevertheless,
there is an important difference between substantive law, which
states the necessary elements of a cause of action, and an eviden-
tiary burden. Both aspects of the law provide policy levers for error
rules. Given the noncredibility of rivals’ protestations of anticom-
petitive injury and the fact that efficiency-enhancing conduct
necessarily injures competitors, there is strong basis for holding
private antitrust complainants to a high evidentiary standard. In
all instances, those plaintiffs should bear the ultimate burden of
demonstrating actual harm or a sufficient likelihood of future
anticompetitive effect.
This notion should not be controversial. The great difficulty lies
in defining and applying a test that demonstrates a breach of the
substantive law. In lieu of such a test, policymakers can create an
appropriate obstacle to recovery by establishing a suitable evi-
dentiary burden. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already changed
the procedural rules in private antitrust litigation to avoid error
and cost.217 The “substantially disproportionate” test championed
to impose it. See Picker, supra note 110, at 9-16. It is not clear to us that such arrangements
should fall outside the per se prohibition. As Judge Posner has emphasized, “it makes all the
difference whether minimum retail prices are imposed by the manufacturer in order to evoke
point-of-sale services or by the dealers in order to obtain monopoly profits.” See POSNER, supra
note 122, at 177.
215. See Elhauge, supra note 45, at 257-68.
216. See id. at 266.
217. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408-09
(2004); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 593-95 (1986).
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by the Justice Department’s 2008 report has much to commend it.218
Given the vast limitations encountered in the economic analysis of
unilateral behavior by dominant firms, all-encompassing standards
are likely to aggravate error, rather than to diminish it. In some
circumstances—when the risk and magnitude of Type II errors are
deemed attenuated and Type I errors are apt to be both likely and
especially costly—per se legal rules may be appropriate. The
proffered example was a monopolist’s refusal to grant rivals access
to its physical or intellectual infrastructure in circumstances in
which such access had never been made available before. 
Yet, in many cases, the threat of anticompetitive effect is
sufficiently real that a preclusive per se rule is inappropriate.
Prudent antitrust policy should meet injured rivals’ antitrust claims
with skepticism.219 Although it was a controversial conclusion on
the part of the Justice Department, we believe that the “substan-
tially disproportionate” test is a generally prudent one to apply to
lawsuits initiated by private parties.220 Crucially, however, the
burden is not appropriately applied to the enforcement agencies
themselves. Unlike those of private litigants, the FTC’s and DOJ’s
allegations of anticompetitive behavior are relatively credible.
Efficient behavior in the market will have no adverse impact on the
agencies. Moreover, given the agencies’ substantive expertise, courts
should prove receptive to novel theories of economic harm, even if
they do not ultimately accept those theories upon full consideration. 
218. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at ix, 45-47.
219. In this information-deprived setting, selection bias will surely mean that a majority
of the antitrust complaints filed in court should not be countenanced. In a completely
information-deprived setting, in which judges have no ability to establish conclusively the
long-run commercial impact of a challenged practice, they would reach the right result more
often than not—and save substantial litigation costs—by rejecting all claims. In a more
realistic setting, in which judges have some ability, albeit limited, to assess the short- and
long-run consequences of challenged behavior, the high likelihood of plaintiffs’ misplaced
incentives justifies a presumption of legality. This presumption can be given various forms,
but it must in all cases create an evidentiary burden that requires a plaintiff to establish that
anticompetitive effect is considerably more likely than not on the facts of the case. The Justice
Department’s 2008 report advocated just such a burden.
220. Of course, Part III.A indicated that antitrust analysis of different practices should
vary according to the relative risks and magnitude of false positives and negatives likely to
be encountered in distinct settings. Thus, the “substantially disproportionate” test ought to
be applied in malleable fashion. Nevertheless, this test is better characterized as creating an
evidentiary burden, rather than a substantive rule or standard for establishing what is and
is not anticompetitive.
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By this interactive dynamic, the courts and agencies can test the
boundaries of antitrust law and ultimately improve the juris-
prudence that defines it. Historically, this system of checks and
balances has produced great benefits. The agencies’ promotion of
economically sophisticated merger doctrine provides the prime
example of how they can improve flawed doctrine by influencing the
courts over a sustained period of time.221 Similarly, there are many
instances in which the courts have properly prevented the FTC and
DOJ from overreaching the confines of sound economics. 
Given the self-evident advantages brought by agency flexibility,
self-imposed conditions on enforcement actions are of questionable
value if they are crafted too restrictively. Although guidelines have
excellent educational value for companies that wish to comply with
the antitrust laws, and can desirably influence the law, they can
carry negative consequences. Draconian conditions can tie the hands
of an agency, even in situations in which the risk of error is small.
Indeed, the courts typically hold the FTC and DOJ to their guide-
lines.222 Thus, the Justice Department’s report might have been
better placed as a set of guidelines for the courts to follow in cases
brought by aggrieved private litigants. The report should have made
clear that the Antitrust Division did not intend to hold itself to those
demanding evidentiary standards, which would have required it to
persuade the court in every case that the likely anticompetitive
effect of a practice substantially outweighed any associated benefits. 
We therefore counsel an evidentiary asymmetry between cases
taken by private litigants, on the one hand, and the enforcement
agencies, on the other. One might disagree with this, however, on
the basis of trust. Can we really trust the government to bring
economically coherent claims of antitrust violations that are in the
public interest? The short answer is a qualified “yes,” when com-
pared to lawsuits initiated by the injured rivals of a defendant. Of
course, the agencies are prone to miscalculation and overreaching,
as is any entity subject to imperfect human judgment. They have
demonstrably taken a more aggressive stance in some monopoliza-
221. See generally Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution
vs. the Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 931, 945-62 (1988) (illustrating how the Chicago
School has become predominant).
222. See, e.g., Cmty. Publ’rs, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-55 (W.D. Ark.
1995).
130 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:075
tion cases than was prudent. And there is no question that the FTC
and DOJ can act in politically biased ways, often reflecting the
sociopolitical perspective of the executive. This perspective, of
course, may or may not mirror the consensus view of economists. It
may or may not reflect sound policy. Conceivably, the agencies could
operate as an instrument for sociopolitical forces that have interests
other than allocative efficiency at heart. 
Despite these imperfections, the fact remains that the enforce-
ment agencies bring great expertise to antitrust matters, and can
generally be trusted to bring actions that promote the common
good. Given the indeterminacy present in economic calculation and
the political sensitivity of the conduct ultimately regulated, the
administration of competition law does not lend itself to ubiquitous
agreement. The agencies’ views will routinely run counter to those
held by some economists, lawyers, and courts. And they will some-
times run counter to one another. But the fact of disagreement in
this complex field should hardly nullify the agencies’ expertise or
reduce the importance of their roles. 
The agencies should continue to advance novel theories of
anticompetitive conduct, and the courts should entertain those
theories hospitably, even if they ultimately reject them. They ought
to consider holding the agencies to a lower burden of persuasion
than they would require of private parties. The reciprocal con-
straints placed by the agencies and courts on one another are likely
to yield superior outcomes in the long run. This fact justifies some
asymmetry in the reception of antitrust complaints. Ultimately, the
judiciary ought to be less concerned about Type I errors in the
context of an agency enforcement proceeding. 
CONCLUSION
Questions of antitrust liability are often beset with uncertainty,
which is highly problematic given the cost of mistakes in either
direction. Erroneous condemnation punishes procompetitive be-
havior, stifles incentives to compete and innovate, and may
seriously diminish long-run welfare. Yet mistakenly sanctioning
exclusionary, collusive, or predatory behavior yields other costs,
most obviously with respect to reduced levels of static and dynamic
efficiency. Because the information required to facilitate determina-
2010] ANTITRUST ERROR 131
tive analysis is presently unavailable, enforcers must rely on some
form of error analysis in formulating the best possible liability
decisions.
The current mode of antitrust-error analysis reflects Chief Judge
Easterbrook’s influential article in the 1984 issue of the Texas Law
Review.223 His view was straightforward: Type I errors are worse
than false negatives because the former are perpetual, whereas the
latter will be promptly eroded by the corrective forces of the free
market.224 Judge Easterbrook’s position may be thought of as an
antithesis, the thesis being the “inhospitability tradition”225 that had
characterized antitrust law throughout the 1950s and 1960s and led
to the host of per se rules adopted during that era. The Warren
Court’s approach to antitrust during this era may fairly be charac-
terized as displaying an implicit preference for Type II errors. Judge
Easterbrook reacted intelligently but extravagantly. This Article
has argued that it is now time for a synthesis.
We believe error analysis in competition law can be improved by
focusing on four grounds. First, Type I errors are not necessarily
more harmful to society than false negatives, particularly on a
cumulative basis. Second, a false positive need not eliminate the full
social value of the conduct wrongly condemned. Second-best options
remain open to the affected companies and it is possible that these
may in fact produce preferable outcomes in the long run. Third,
improper rules of law are not perpetual. Stare decisis is unusually
weak in the antitrust realm226 and swathes of “moth-eaten”227
precedent have been overruled.228 Although some of these holdings
have been a long time coming, the law has invariably facilitated end
223. See Easterbrook, supra note 10.
224. Id. at 9-17, 39-40.
225. See Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction: Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979).
226. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
227. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
228. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (prohibiting maximum
resale price maintenance), overruled by Khan, 522 U.S. at 3; Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 394-96, 406-09 (1911) (finding minimum resale price maintenance
illegal), overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. 877. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
recognized that another decision, United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-74,
277-79 (1966), which prohibited a merger that would have resulted in a mere 7.5 percent
market share because of a trend toward concentration in the market, has effectively been
abrogated. See United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1990).
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runs around mistaken rules long before they were formally over-
ruled.229 Fourth, it is not the case that free-market forces will
always undo anticompetitive harms within a reasonable time.
Indeed, some network-effect-driven markets have shown themselves
to be resistant to displacement of the incumbent monopolists.230
These considerations lead us to believe that a one-size-fits-all
error rule is nonoptimal and that courts and enforcers should
deviate from erring on the side of underenforcement in some
situations. We explored a variety of challenged business practices
and indicated how analysis ought to be conducted with sensitivity
to the deficiencies underlying contemporary error rules. Were
antitrust enforcers, courts, and academics to be mindful of these
nuanced points, we would be less likely to bear witness to damaging
instances of divergence of the kind that have recently afflicted the
agencies.231 Increasingly sophisticated error rules would lay a solid
foundation for further evolution in antitrust law.
229. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part II.B.2.
